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REPORT OF THE NASA AD HOC COMMITTEE ON FAILURE OF
HIGH STRENGTH STRUCTURAL MATERIALS
ABSTRACT
The Charter of the Committee as established by the Deputy Administrator was
twofold; namely, to collect and publish information on NASA's structural failures that
have occurred during the past few years, and to determine what additional research
NASA should perform to reduce the risk of future failures.
In carrying out this assignment the Committee reviewed the reports of 231
examples of structural failures encountered over the last 5 years in NASA's programs.
Attempts were made to identify those factors which contributed to the failures, and
recommendations were formulated for actions which would minimize their effects on
NASA's future programs.
The factors identified fall into two general classes:
(1) Those associated with deficiencies in the existing materials and structures
technology
(2) Those attributable to inadequate documentation or communication of that
technology
The Report summarizes the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee.
Detailed discussion and supporting information are presented in the Appendices.
The Committee found that during the past 5 years NASA has been relatively
free of in-flight failures that could be attributed to deficiencies in materials or
structures. Most of the failures involved ground equipment, development hardware,
or the ground testing of flight hardware. A major conclusion of the Committee is that
very few structural failures could be attributed to deficiencies in the technology of
high strength materials and structural analysis. However, these few were very
serious and had a large impact on both program cost and schedule. The great majority
of failures were traceable to inadequate dissemination or utilization of available
information, and to the unrealistic assessments of technology, cost, and schedule that
too often characterize the initial planning stages of aerospace programs. It is
important to recognize that NASA's future programs are more demanding in terms of
high strength materials technology than any of its past projects. For this reason it
is of vital importance to ensure adequate support for the R&D programs that provide
this advanced technology. r
The recommendations of the Committee are intended to provide NASA with
procedures which should contribute significantly to a reduction in the risk of failure of
aerospace structures. These recommendations can be placed in two classes:
(1) Those which can be implemented through our present activities
(2) Those that require additional procedures or new functions
A brief summary of these follows:
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Class 1.
A. While our materials and structures research programs are well balanced and
have made substantial contributions to all pertinent areas of the technology,
certain areas require intensification of effort. Included in these would be the
study of fracture as influenced by crack like flaws (fracture mechanics), the
influence of service environmental factors on fracture behavior, and the
development of materials evaluation and design procedures for composite
structures (see Section II).
B. NASA should encourage DOD to continue funding of its technical information
services, and NASA support should be increased for selected activities in this
group. These services have been of considerable benefit to NASA over the past
decade, but NASA contributes very little to their support. The total funding
supplied to these services has been gradually reduced until at present it is about
two-thirds of the 1969 level, and there is no assurance it will be continued after
fiscal 1972. Further reductions would seriously reduce the effectiveness of
these services, and their elimination would have an adverse effect on the efforts
of both NASA and DOD to increase the integrity of aerospace structures (see
Section III).
C. The computerized literature searching facilities used by both NASA and DOD
should be enabled to search for information on materials properties by identifi-
cation through the common names of the materials. The present coding system
does not permit this, and the facilities are therefore of only marginal value to
the designer and materials engineer (see Section II).
Class 2.
A. NASA's control over the use of high strength materials in critical structures
should be substantially strengthened. This can be accomplished by requiring
increased participation of materials application and structural analysis specialists
in all phases of program planning and development. Specialists of these types
at NASA Centers should be identified to the various program offices and under
appropriate circumstances could be selected to serve on a Materials Review
Board (see Section III).
NASA should formulate a set of Materials Guidelines which would identify
particularly sensitive materials. Contractors using these materials should be
required to show how this sensitivity is to be overcome.
B. NASA should strengthen its internal mechanisms for collection, documentation,
and dissemination of technical information in the following areas:
1. Reporting and analysis of failures-an area where we are particularly weak
2. Structural design and materials selection criteria-an area where present
efforts should be expanded
ii
3. Techniques and limitations of nondestructive evaluation (NDE) for both
metallic and nonmetallic structures-a critical area requiring prompt
attention to develop a useful function
It is recommended that a central office be designated within the OART which would
have the responsibility of developing means for improving NASA's function in the
above areas and working with the program offices to provide education to con-
tractors in special cases where the technology is not well or widely known (see
Section III).
iii 0. '
INTRODUCTION
The Committee on Failure of High Strength Materials was established on June
22, 1970, by the Acting Administrator for Advanced Research and Technology in
response to a request from the Deputy Administrator in a memorandum dated April
28, 1970 (see Appendix D). The purpose of the Committee was to identify and examine
those factors which have contributed to structural failures of aerospace hardware as
encountered by both NASA and the Air Force. The Committee directed its attention
to three areas, namely (1) a review and analysis of selected reports for representative
types of failures; (2) assessment of the technology that is available for material selection,
and design of highly stressed aerospace structures; and (3) communication of infor-
mation relating to this technology.
Panels of specialists selected from NASA Headquarters and NASA Centers studied
each of these areas. This report represents a consensus of the Committee based on
these studies. The individual Panel Reports are presented in Appendices A to D and
represent the opinions of the authors based on their experience and interpretation of
published information.
The Committee established liaison with a similar, but substantially wider
ranging, Air Force investigation of recent experience with failure of aircraft structural
materials. Two members of the Air Force Technology Subcommittee, R. F. Hoener
of the Wright-Patterson Flight Dynamics Laboratory and J. J. Mattice of the Wright-
Patterson Materials Laboratory, participated in the initial meeting and provided
information on the organization of the Air Force activity. It was further agreed that
the findings of the two studies would be exchanged.
Throughout this report special attention has been given to high strength materials,
and it is useful to review briefly the reasons for this emphasis. Aerospace applications
are particularly weight critical, and this inevitably leads to the use of materials having
high ratios of strength to density. The Deputy Administrator in his request for this
study pointed out that serious problems can be associated with the use of high strength
materials in critical components. It is generally true that as the conventional tensile
strength of a material is increased it becomes less "forgiving" in the sense that it is
more sensitive to those factors which can severely limit its strength potential such as
the presence of small flaws, corrosive environments, errors in fabrication, etc.
Perhaps the most important, although simple, concept to evolve in the last decade is
the recognition:
(1) That we must accept the existence of cracks or crack-like flaws in our
hardware, as produced, or that cracks will develop in service from such
mechanisms as fatigue, or stress corrosion
(2) That these cracks at some critical size may suddenly propagate to produce
a catastrophic failure of a "brittle" nature
(3) That the stress level at which this failure occurs can be well below the
conventional tensile yield strength of the material
The crack size which can trigger a brittle failure depends on the material, its
metallurgical condition, and the hardware geometry. Without exception, the tendency
to brittle fracture increases with the thickness of the section containing the flaw. There
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have been examples of flaws in thick walled pressure vessels which removed only 0.01
percent of the load-carrying area but reduced the expected load-carrying capacity by
50 percent.
From the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that high conventional safety factors
may actually be dangerous, if they are achieved by increasing the strength level of the
material, unless all phases of production are attended by a careful fracture control
program which should include the best nondestructive evaluation methods as well as
properly designed proof tests when these are appropriate. These steps require
increased sophistication and more attentiveness on the part of the designers, fabricators,
and inspectors. However, it is the nature of NASA's mission to require the application
of high strength materials, and our materials and structures programs will emphasize
overcoming their deficiencies and understanding their safe use.
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SECTION I: REVIEW OF FAILURE REPORTS
This section summarizes the Committee's conclusions and recommendations
based on examination of the structural failure experience of NASA during the past 5
years. The object of the study was to determine the availability of failure information
and attempt to establish and classify the causes and mechanisms of failure. It was
judged that such information would be useful in defining the types of research or other
activities that would be helpful in reducing the risk of future failures.
Procurement of Information
Committee members were requested to supply from their respective Centers
all reports dealing with failures of structural materials during the past 5 years. In
response, reports were received from Goddard Space Flight Center, Marshall Space
Flight Center, Manned Spacecraft Center, Langley Research Center, and Lewis
Research Center. Where appropriate, personal contact was made with those persons
who were most familiar with the failure analysis. With a few notable exceptions, the
reports gave only brief descriptions of the failures and very little information
concerning the possible causes and mechanisms of failure. In most cases, the personal
contacts were able to provide little additional information. Failures that had a large
impact on NASA's programs (e.g., test stand failure of S IVB 503) have been reported
in detail, and some have been widely discussed in the open literature. However,
sometimes this reporting has not been timely nor in a form that would ensure review
by all appropriate members of NASA management.
In order to supplement the information in the failure reports, the Committee
enlisted the counsel of research engineers who have been intimately involved in most
of the important materials and structures problems of the last decade. The results of
the analysis of failure information presented by the Committee are consistent with the
experience of these experts. Further, neither the members of the Committee nor
their consultants are aware of any major type or cause of structural failure experienced
by NASA which is not represented in the analysis. To develop more accurate informa-
tion would be impossible in most cases because the failed parts are no longer available
for examination and in some cases the personnel involved are no longer with NASA.
For the various reasons given above, the Committee judged that further attempts
to document the history of NASA's structural failures would not be worthwhile nor
would a separate publication of this information be desirable.
Classification of Failures
In order to summarize the failure information in a way that would be helpful in
reducing future risks, an attempt was made to develop a "failure matrix" which
assigned both a CAUSE and a MECHANISM to each failure. This matrix is shown in
table I at the end of this section. The failure CAUSES are defined as follows:
(1) Defective Material-Material as received from the vendor contained defects
not acceptable in terms of the specifications. This would include those
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cases where critical cracks or flaws went undetected due to some
deficiency in the inspection methods or procedures. The limitations
of nondestructive evaluation procedures are discussed in Section II of this
report.
(2) Improper fabrication-Processes and procedures used to fabricate the
material into a structure were in conflict with specifications or with
recognized good practice to a degree that an unsatisfactory product resulted.
Included here would be hydrogen embrittlement introduced by improper
plating processes; out-of-tolerance parts, cracks, or flaws introduced by
forming operations, etc.
(3) Poor design-Features of the structure established by the designer were
such that inherent weakness was built into the hardware. Included here
would be faulty stress analysis, loads applied improperly in respect to the
fiber of the material, machining radii too small for the material, known
aggressive environments not taken into account, etc.
(4) Improper use-The structure was subjected to service loads or environments
not intended in the design. Also included here is faulty maintenance that
led to failure.
(5) Inadequate knowledge of service conditions-This class contains those cases
where the loading or environmental conditions were not defined well enough
to produce a satisfactory design. Included would be the effects of unantici-
pated vibratory loads, aggressive environments, etc. These cases repre-
sent a technology deficiency and include costly, serious, and stubborn
problems.
(6) Inadequate materials knowledge-The materials technology was deficient
and not even the specialist would have anticipated the problem. There are
only a few examples in this class, but they represent our most serious
failures in terms of cost and impact on schedules. Included are stress
corrosion cracking of titanium in nitrogen tetroxide (N 2 04) and in methanol.
These failures are discussed in detail in Appendix A. The subject of
adequacy of materials knowledge is treated in Section II of this report.
The MECHANISMS listed in table I are rough descriptions of what appeared to be
the dominant process that eventually led to failure of the structure. It is recognized
that these classifications lack the precision that would be desirable, and that many
failures result from a combination of factors. Unfortunately, most failure reports
do not contain sufficient information to permit a better system of classification. In
about 40 percent of the cases, the Mechanism is listed as Other. This class includes
those cases reported as tensile overload and those where no mechanism was identified.
While most of the failure reports were deficient in definition of the failure mechanism,
it should be recognized that an accurate description of the processes leading to failure
generally requires an extensive investigation by experts using highly sophisticated
equipment.
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Conclusions and Recommendations
The Committee submitted the following conclusions and recommendations
concerning the availability and adequacy of failure information.
Conclusions:
1. NASA has been relatively free of in-flight failures that could be attributed to
deficiencies in materials or structures. Most of the failure reports involved
ground equipment, development hardware, or ground testing of flight hardware.
2. There is no standard system for recording failure information within NASA, nor
is there any central activity that attempts to analyze failure reports for general
trends and then to pass on this information to all concerned NASA activities.
3. The majority of NASA failures were of the type that could be corrected easily
with little impact on program cost and schedules. There were, however, a few
very serious failures, and outstanding examples of these are given in Appendix A.
4. There is little evidence to indicate that our understanding of material behavior
has been deficient in most of the problems encountered. About 78 percent of the
failure causes were classified as improper fabrication or poor design. Because
many contractors (especially the smaller ones) do not require design review by
material specialists, it is likely that the majority of failures in these classes
were the result of not having the necessary information at the right time. This
matter of data availability is treated in Section III on Communication of Data.
5. While few failures were classified as associated with the mechanisms of
oxidation and hydrogen embrittlement, these should not be discounted as unim-
portant. In the case of hydrogen embrittlement, past experience with aircraft
structural parts has shown that failures due to hydrogen embrittlement can be
very serious. In respect to oxidation, it would be reasonable to expect that this
failure mechanism would assume increased importance in the shuttle program
where high strength materials will be operating at high temperatures in the
presence of oxidizing atmospheres.
6. Certain high strength alloys were particularly susceptible to failure by a
mechanism of corrosion. These include the aluminum alloys, 7075T6 and
7079T6; the stainless steels, AM355 and 17-7PH; and the high strength versions
of the common low alloy steels, 4330 and 4340.
Recommendations: The following recommendations are offered for improvement in
the failure analysis and documentation procedures. In addition, suggestions are
also offered for modifications in the contractual requirements that should reduce the
risk of failures in aerospace structures.
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1. A single group within NASA should be assigned the responsibility of developing
uniform reporting standards for structural failures and recommending failure
analysis procedures. This same group should be responsible for the dissemina-
tion of this type of information. Section II of this report gives suggestions
concerning the implementation of these recommendations by designating a
Headquarters Office in OART.
2. In order to make this standard reporting system effective, a review and action
procedure should be established by each program office to ensure that the
information is transmitted to the appropriate groups and is properly utilized by
them.
3. NASA should require from its contractors the following information:
a. Evidence that their system of engineering drawing release includes
appropriate review by materials specialists
b. A failure mode analysis of critical components which is experimentally
verified when feasible
c. The materials data used in the design and their source
6
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SECTION II: ASSESSMENT OF TECHNOLOGY
The conclusions and recommendations of the Committee regarding the adequacy
of the technology in relation to the selection of materials and design methods for
aerospace hardware are summarized in this section. Attention was given to the question
as to whether the technology existing at the time of the past failures was adequate to
have prevented them and whether the present state of technology is adequate to minimize
the risk of future failures satisfactorily. In addition, consideration was given to what
areas of research need emphasis to improve the methodology of design and materials
application in order to provide more efficient hardware with a lower risk of failure
than we can now produce. NASA's R&D programs that are designed to provide improved
materials (e.g., higher toughness and strength, better oxidation resistance, etc.)
were not reviewed. These programs also have the objective of improving structural
reliability.
The reports of the Panel members are presented in Appendix B. These give
background information in the several areas covered by the Panel studies and present
detailed assessment of the technology as well as recommendations for research.
Conclusions and Recommendations
In the following summary of conclusions and recommendations of the Panel
on the Assessment of Technology, emphasis has been placed on those areas where
NASA's research efforts should be strengthened. Reference should be made to Appendix
B for further details and for a description of those research areas where our present
efforts appear to be adequate.
Conclusions:
1. There is sufficient understanding among the technical specialists of the various
factors which limit the strength potential of high strength alloys to establish
significance of these factors in the selection of materials and in the design of
hardware. However, this understanding does not yet extend to the point where
analytical design methods are available which, by themselves, could adequately
minimize the risk of failure of highly efficient complex hardware. This deficiency
results from factors such as uncertainty concerning the environments that will
be encountered in service; complex loading conditions, such as random fatigue
loads and the interaction of temperature environment for which established
design methods do not exist; unintentional variations in production and fabrication
procedures that can affect the mechanical properties; and the as yet poorly
understood practical limitations of NDE methods. Therefore, all members of a
technical program team should take into account the following concepts:
a. Although the designer must use the best and latest design concepts, a
paper design must be followed by simulated service tests of simplified
but representative components and finally by simulated service tests of
actual hardware.
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b. Structural materials are inherently flawed, and crack growth will occur
during service. Therefore, materials should be selected which are
compatible with the proven capability of NDE methods to detect cracks, and,
where possible, a suitably designed proof test should be used to establish
the upper limit on initial flaw sizes. Further, an in-service inspection
frequency should be selected which will ensure that cracks can be detected
before they reach a dangerous size.
2. Linear elastic fracture mechanics and its associated plane strain fracture tough-
ness values (KIC) can provide a valuable tool for the designer in his fracture
control program provided that the basic assumptions of the theory are not
violated in its application to the practical problem. Unfortunately, there is an
increasing tendency to apply linear elastic fracture mechanics to situations where
the basic assumptions are not even remotely approached. Under some circum-
stances such applications can increase rather than reduce the risk of failure.
For further details see Appendix B, Design Methods.
In this connection it should be noted that DOD has requested the National Materials
Advisory Board of the National Research Council to establish an ad hoc Committee
on the Application of Fracture Prevention Principles to Aircraft. One of the
objectives of this Committee will be to define more clearly the role of elastic
fracture mechanics in aircraft design. W. F. Brown, Jr., of NASA-Lewis is a
consultant to this Committee.
3. Generally, the past failure problems have been related to a lack of utilization of
existing knowledge during the material selection, design, and testing phases of
the hardware programs rather than to an absence of the necessary information.
4. Our materials and structures research programs are at present reasonably well
balanced and have made major contributions to the technology in all pertinent areas
of materials research and structural analysis including fracture mechanics,
fatigue, and corrosion. In fact, many of the major contributors to these areas
are at NASA Centers. It is vital that support for these programs be continued at
present levels if we are to avoid a set of new and potentially more dangerous
failures in our future aerospace hardware.
Recommendations: The following critical areas require an intensification of our research
efforts:
1. Standardized test procedures should be developed for the determination of fracture
properties and stress corrosion resistance of metallic alloys. These methods
would supplement the already available ASTM Standard for determining plane
strain fracture toughness (KIc). For further details see Appendix B, Fracture
Toughness, Selection of Materials and Stress Corrosion, Selection of Materials.
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2. Long range plans should be established by NASA and DOD to provide systemmatic
data on fatigue, fatigue crack propogation, and fracture properties of structural
materials. These plans should provide for continuity of support of such data-
generating programs.
3. NASA should conduct and sponsor research leading to improved design procedures
for combatting fatigue and improving fracture tolerance in aerospace structures.
These procedures should include: 1. computer systems for handling large
volumes of empirical data and 2. reliable methods for conducting fatigue evalu-
ation tests of complete structures within practical time schedules.
4. NASA should develop improved methods for anticipating and monitoring service
loadings in individual aircraft.
5. Additional research is needed to define clearly the limitations of conventional
NDE procedures in terms of their sensitivity to actual cracks and to develop
improved techniques. This very important area requires a focal point within
NASA which would coordinate research activities and establish a reference file
of information concerning the characteristics of available equipment. For
further details see Appendix B, Nondestructive Evaluation.
6. Additional research is needed in the area of gaseous hydrogen embrittlement with
particular emphasis on the effects of hydrogen pressure, temperature, and
loading rate on the tendency to delayed failure in the presence of cracks. For
further details see Appendix B, Hydrogen Embrittlement.
7. As indicated in Appendix B, Composite Materials, the rational design of highly
stressed hardware made from composites requires additional information on
mechanical properties derived from standard tests, better structural analysis
procedures, and the development of nondestructive evaluation techniques suitable
for detecting manufacturing flaws.
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SECTION III: DOCUMENTATION AND COMMUNICATION OF INFORMATION
While the causes and mechanisms of NASA's structural failures were not always
clear, the Committee found that in the majority of cases the problems encountered
were fixed by application of technology that existed at the time the structures were
designed. The conclusion, of course, is that the designer or project engineers did not
have access to the necessary information or for some reason did not apply the knowledge
at hand. The Committee, therefore, examined the adequacy of documentation and
communication of technical information related to the selection of materials for aero-
space structures and for the design of such structures. Included in this information are
failure analysis, mechanical and physical properties of structural materials, and the
influence of fabrication processes and service conditions on these properties, as well
as methods of structural analysis.
The Committee gave consideration to the following topics:
(1) Sources of information
(2) Accessibility of information
(3) Discipline in use of information
The following is a summary of the Committee's conclusions and recommendations.
More detailed information is given in Appendix C.
Conclusions:
1. There are several very useful and nationally recognized handbooks and Information
Centers which provide information on materials properties and problem areas.
Some of these activities have been in existence for over a decade. Most of their
support is supplied by DOD with a relatively small amount coming from NASA.
They have been under continuous pressure from the Office of Defense Research
and Engineering to become self-supporting, but their DOD funding has declined
gradually over the past few years until at present it is about two-thirds of the
1969 level. The present plans of DOD are to require that the Information Centers
obtain at least 50 percent of their funds from sale of their services during fiscal
1972 or all DOD support will be withdrawn. This requirement appears to be
unrealistic in view of the basically limited market for such services which
presently is further reduced by the depressed condition of our aerospace industry.
Further cuts in their support would seriously reduce their effectiveness and
their elimination would have a substantial adverse impact on NASA and DOD
efforts to increase the integrity of aerospace structures (see Appendix C,
Sources of Information).
2. Both handbooks and Information Centers would be more effective and efficient
if reports generated from NASA or Air Force research and development activity
on materials would be automatically distributed to the pertinent handbook or
Information Center activity (see Appendix C, Accessibility of Information).
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3. Neither the NASA RECON nor the DDC computerized literature searching
facilities are able to identify report titles containing alloy property data through
a code relating to common alloy types. Therefore, these facilities are of
marginal use to the materials engineer and designer.
4. The risk of failure of aerospace structures and the cost of their development
could be significantly reduced if NASA would improve its system for documentation
and dissemination of pertinent technical information throughout both its program
offices and contract operations. At present, NASA is weak in this area, in
part because there is no central group charged with the responsibility of assisting
the program offices in identifying the sources of pertinent information.
5. It is very important that the risks of failure be assessed early in the design
phase of hardware development by appropriate materials and structural analysis
specialists. Unfortunately, in most cases these specialists are not able to
quantify the failure risks and their recommendations are balanced against direct
calculations of performance and weight. Thus, management is faced with a
difficult problem of judgement, and, to be most effective, this should be made
well before performance and weight are fixed. Otherwise it is likely that the
measures recommended to reduce failure risks will result in decreases in
performance or increases in weight which are hard to take when the program is
well along.
Recommendations:
1. NASA should increase its support (with other Government agencies) of selected
materials information services that summarize or accumulate and analyze
mechanical and physical property data on metals, composites, and plastics of
particular interest to the aerospace industry. Examples of activities of this type
that should be supported include:
a. The Aerospace Structural Metals Handbook
b. MIL-Handbooks 5, 17, and 23
c. Defense Metals Information Center
2. The NASA RECON.. syste.., should be so modified that searches by alloy type would
be possible. This could be accomplished by the introduction of a systematic
coding system for metallic alloys and other structural materials. The alloy
coding system used in the Aerospace Structural Metals Handbook might be suitable
for metallic alloys and if used would greatly increase the usefulness of the RECON
system to the handbook editors.
3. NASA should arrange to place the Air Force Information Centers and handbook
activities on automatic distribution for NASA internal and contractor reports
dealing with materials properties and structural analysis.
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4. NASA should develop a rational plan to apply the best technical judgement to each
project on a timely basis and establish controls that ensure its execution. This
plan should include:
a. Introduction of materials specialists and structural experts into the project
at the planning stage before performance requirements are fixed
b. Development of a "Materials Selection Guide" which identifies those
material conditions which are particularly sensitive to strength limiting
factors (e.g., stress corrosion, small flaws, fabrication processes, etc.)
and adoption as part of contracts
c. Justification by contractor of selection of a sensitive material and how this
sensitivity will be overcome in the proposed application
d. Identification within NASA Centers of materials application and structural
analysis specialists who could assist the program offices during the design
phase of critical components and who could, when appropriate, serve on a
Materials Review Board
5. NASA should contractually require the following:
a. That failure mode analysis be conducted for all major failures and that
the derived information be analyzed and incorporated into a report suitable
for distribution to all pertinent organizational segments of NASA
b. Evidence that a meaningful fracture control program is being developed by
the contractor early in the design phase of the project
c. Evidence that material specialists have been consulted in the drawing
approval chain for all critical parts
6. It is recommended that an office be designated within OART (possibly in the
Materials and Structures Division). This office would, with the assistance of
appropriate Center representatives:
a. Co-operate with other Government agencies in supporting information
collection and dissemination services
b. Act as a clearinghouse for failure analysis reports
c. Expand efforts in design criteria
d. Disseminate to project offices and contractors appropriate educational
material concerning information sources and methods to avoid failures of
the type experienced in the past
e. Develop Materials Selection Guidelines and identify those persons in
NASA Centers who are specialists in materials application and structural
analysis
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APPENDIX A: Review of Failure Reports
Panel Members:
Chairman, R. E. Johnson, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center
R. R. Heldenfels, NASA Langley Research Center
W. R. Lucas, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center
M. L. Moseson, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center
APPENDIX A: REVIEW OF FAILURE REPORTS
by Robert E. Johnson
NASA Manned Spacecraft Center
The failure analysis found two types of structural failures where the cause could
clearly be classified as "Inadequate Materials Knowledge." These were associated
with the stress corrosion of Apollo titanium alloy tanks in the presence of pure nitrogen
tetroxide and anhydrous methanol. These failures seriously impacted five major
program areas both in terms of schedule and cost. Experiments carried out after the
failures were encountered indicated that stress corrosion cracking of titanium alloys
can occur in the presence of certain organic fluids and pure N2 04 if even very small
surface discontinuities (such as a rough machined surface or surface scratches) are
present. This was a fact unknown to the experts in the stress corrosion behavior of
metallic materials. A brief review of these two failure types follows.
Titanium and N204
Tests were performed by the contractor to demonstrate compatibility before
the combination of 6A1-4V-Ti was approved as a pressure vessel material for use in
Apollo systems. These tests included stressed samples in contact with oxidizer
procured to the Government specification covering N 2 0 4 (MVIIL-P-26539A). In June
1964 two large Apollo Service Propulsion System titanium alloy tanks successfully
passed 30-day tests while pressurized with N 2 0 4 . All the test data indicated compa-
tibility of the alloy with the oxidizer.
Unknown to NASA and their contractors, the U.S. Air Force was working with
the producer of N2 04 to standardize its composition, and a manufacturing process-
change was made by the producer on May 20, 1964, which resulted in a higher purity
product by eliminating certain products including nitric oxide (NO). Since the
MIL-P-26539A specification did not require analysis for NO or the reporting of the
amount present, the change was not detected by NASA contractors until after stress
corrosion cracking failures occurred in ground testing an Apollo RCS tank in January
1965. The failure analysis and subsequent test programs are well documented in the
literature and in Apollo reporting systems. Since Apollo, Saturn, Lunar Orbiter,
and USAF hardware were involved, and interagency, intercenter committee managed
the test programs, which resulted in a NASA specification (MSC-PPD-2) controlling
the composition of N2 0 4 and specifying limits on the NO content that would prevent
stress corrosion cracking of the titanium alloy.
The Apollo, Saturn, and Lunar Orbiter programs are now using the new
NASA-grade N 2 04 , and no further failures have been encountered. This problem is
an example of the high level of control that is required when sensitive metal conditions
are exposed to potentially aggressive environments.
Titanium and Methanol: In October 1966, a pressure check on the Apollo Service
Propulsion System was being performed at North American Rockwell using methyl
alcohol (methanol) as the pressurizing fluid instead of the toxic and hazardous
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propellants that the tank would contain during service operation. This procedure and
fluid were used on earlier spacecraft without incident, but during this test a leak
developed in the 6A1-4V-Ti fuel tank. The leak occurred in the weld heat-affected
zone, and subsequent analysis revealed no material defects other than a weld mismatch,
which resulted in a sharp notch effect on the inside surface of the cylinder. At that
time, the methanol was not suspect because of its previous uses and because no
reports of incompatibility between titanium and methanol existed in the literature.
Methanol was used because it matched the propellant in density and viscosity and
because it was easily removed from the system.
During the next spacecraft test, one of the titanium alloy tanks failed catastroph-
ically, resulting in extensive loss of hardware and damage to the test facility.
Metallurgical examination indicated stress corrosion cracking was the cause of failure.
Subsequent tests showed the extreme sensitivity of titanium alloys to dry methanol
containing trace contaminates of chlorides (in part-per-million range).
Extensive searches of technical literature revealed only one earlier report of
titanium-methanol incompatibility, and it involved methanol with small additions of
hydrochloric acid. As a result of this new material problem, NASA, its contractors,
and the Defense Metals Information Center issued immediate reports and called a
special symposium to explain details of the problem as they were known at that time.
Examples of documentation of the subject are NASA TN D-3868 (Feb. 1967) and DMIC
Memorandum 228, March 6, 1967.
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APPENDIX B: ASSESSMENT OF TECHNOLOGY
Detailed reports of the Panel on Assessment of Technology are presented herein.
Also included are reports in two areas that were prepared for the Panel by specialists
at NASA-Lewis Research Center. The Panel considered the adequacy of technology in
terms of those material characteristics which are known to be of critical importance in
the design of aerospace structures; namely (1) cycle dependent fatigue, (2) fatigue at
high temperatures and thermal fatigue, (3) creep, (4) fracture toughness, (5) stress
corrosion, (6) hydrogen embrittlement, (7) oxidation, and (8) subcritical flaw growth.
In addition, reports are included on the important subjects of nondestructive evaluation
(NDE) and on composite materials. This latter subject will assume increasing impor-
tance in the design of future space vehicles and was the only area of materials develop-
ment considered by the Panel. It should be noted, however, that NASA has a large R&D
effort designed to provide improved metallic alloys and that these programs also have
the object of improving structural reliability. Where appropriate, the following topics
were considered under each of the above headings:
(1) Data for material selection-Have the necessary data been obtained which
will permit the designer to select the best materials for resistance to
failure ?
(2) Data for hardware design-Are design data available which define the
expected range of pertinent material properties with a prescribed level of
confidence ?
(3) Material specifications-Have specifications containing these statistically
determined material properties been developed which will permit their
use in the design of critical hardware?
(4) Design methods-Are methods available which will permit a designer to
incorporate the most pertinent material property data into the design?
The Panel solicited assistance from experts at NASA Centers in the areas of
elevated temperature fatigue, creep, oxidation, and composite materials, and their
reports are included in this appendix. In preparing their reports, the authors were
requested to address the specific question, "What direction should be taken by further
research in a particular area if the purpose is to provide the designer with better means
for reducing the risk of failure in aerospace hardware?" Answers to this question
appear in the form of recommended actions at the end of each appendix section.
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CYCLE DEPENDENT FATIGUE
by Herbert F. Hardrath
NASA Langley Research Center
Background
Research and development testing on fatigue have led to a satisfactory appreciation
of the host of parameters that determine fatigue life in service. From this activity have
come many qualitative rules of thumb that are useful to the designer. However, quanti-
tative methods are not yet available for designing efficient structures that are safe from
fatigue failure in service.
Thus, current designs are accomplished through a combination of judgement,
extrapolation from past experience, empirical rules, ad hoc testing, and careful inspection
and maintenance programs. Because of the many uncertainties involved in each step,
many structures are constructed with damage-tolerant features to reduce the likelihood
of catastrophic failures.
Major Parameters
The fatigue phenomenon is critically dependent upon four major parameters and
upon synergistic interactions among them: the material used, the configuration of parts,
the loading experience, and the service environment (chemical and thermal). A brief
comment on each serves to illustrate the complexity of the problem.
Fatigue behavior of a material is dependent upon many factors, such as the life
for a given stress level-a relation that is different for various combinations of mean
and alternating stresses; the notch sensitivity-which is generally greater for materials
with high static strength; and the susceptibility to corrosion-which also is greater for
many high strength materials. The characterization of this behavior to the extent
needed to choose materials requires at least several dozen tests for each variable. To
establish the characteristics to the level needed for quantitative predictions will require
many times that number. Because no quantitative rules are available to relate these
characteristics to each other and to other material properties, no simple measure of
fatigue adequacy of a material is available.
Structural parts inevitably contain holes ,changes of cross section and joints),I . .... ....... -. 5~~. r s 3 bUIitl
each of which introduce local stress concentrations. In principle, such stress concen-
trations must be evaluated accurately for each such structural feature. An error of
10 percent in the estimated local stress could well represent an order of magnitude
error in life of the structure in service. Further, fatigue life is dependent upon the
absolute size of a part. Because this "size effect" is not adequately understood, tests
of scaled specimens can produce significant errors. Consequently the fatigue adequacy
of particular configurations must be verified by tests of full-sized components.
In service, structural parts are almost always subjected to very complex loading
histories caused by maneuvers, gusts, acoustic excitation, landings, taxiing, and other
sources. Each of the loading excursions contributes to the total fatigue "damage"
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inflicted on the parts. Although simple rules are available for assessing the cumulative
effects of complex loading, the predictions by these rules are recognized as being
subject to gross errors. Again, tests in which such loadings are simulated in considerable
detail are quite often required.
Aerospace structural parts are subjected to a variety of hostile environments that
further complicate the designer's problem. Corrosion due to weather, exhaust gases,
food and lavatory spillage, and salt from runways can all have a severe influence on
fatigue behavior. Such influences are rarely simulated in evaluation tests, but raise
more uncertainties concerning predicted lives. Similarly the temperature of the operating
environment can have a significant influence on life, particularly when the temperature
is high enough to introduce creep. This behavior is discussed in more detail in the
following section on Fatigue at High Temperatures and Thermal Fatigue.
Improvements Through Research
Systematic research that identifies the role played by each of the parameters cited
earlier is in progress in many laboratories. Because of the very large number of
variables within each major factor, a tremendous number of tests would be required to
provide sufficient design data on which to base a structural design. Fatigue research
conducted in NASA laboratories at Langley and Lewis is devoted to establishing better
quantitative rules that will aid the designer to do his job with fewer ad hoc tests. This
research is generally recognized to be among the most significant being conducted in
this area of engineering. The following are examples of notable advances that have
been made:
(1) Development of quantitative methods for anticipating stresses near discon-
tinuities even when the stress exceeds the yield strength
(2) Identification and rationalization of systematic nonlinear trends in cumula-
tive damage
(3) Identification of the systematic effects introduced by various loading
sequences
(4) Demonstration of deleterious effects of outdoor environment
(5) Investigation of the fatigue behavior of titanium alloys as influenced by the
operating environment of the supersonic transport
(6) Separation of the fatigue process into a crack initiation and crack
propagation phase and application of quantitative treatment to both
Many of these results are helping to shape the philosophy of designing and testing
to avert fatigue failures in service. However, large numbers of effects and combinations
of parameters must still be studied systematically before an overall quantitative design
concept can be developed. Much more research directed toward such engineering
solutions is needed.
As indicated previously, research to improve materials and their behavior has
not been considered deliberately by this committee. However, very large numbers of
simple fatigue tests (usually rotating beams) are conducted for this purpose. Although
under some circumstances such tests are useful for selection of materials, the results
are rarely of use to the designer in establishing permissible stress levels in complex
hardware.
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Design Philosophy
In view of the complex nature of the fatigue problem and the inadequate state of
design rules for preventing fatigue problems in service, designers frequently in-
corporate "fail-safe" or "damage tolerant" features in primary structures to avert
catastrophic failures in service. Two general features are usually employed: the
structural components are configured in such a way that a crack that leads to failure
of a given part does not precipitate failure of the whole, and materials and stress
levels are chosen so that fatigue cracks grow at a rate slow enough to be detected by
prescribed inspection procedures.
The fracture concepts discussed in the section on Fracture Toughness are basic
ingredients to fail-safe design. However, fracture concepts must be developed to
apply to practical materials (most of which display considerable ductility) in realistic
complex configurations. In addition, the behavior of fatigue cracks under complex
load histories must be thoroughly investigated. Until these extensions of fracture
mechanics are made, this design approach is also dependent upon judgement and
extrapolation from previous experience. Fail-safe tests are frequently performed on
full-scale hardware to satisfy certification requirements. NASA personnel play a
leading role in investigating the behavior and in developing the necessary design rules.
Partly because fatigue design technology is inadequate and partly because the
available technology and its limitations are not understood adequately, designers too
frequently make mistakes in judgement. The extreme pressures to produce lightweight
structures at low cost may force these judgements to be made on the unsafe side.
Conclusions:
The large number of parameters influencing fatigue behavior, the complexity and
variety of details that comprise a practical structure, the complexity of the service
environment and the statistical variability of each of these factors render the analytical
prediction of fatigue life impossible at present. Improved quantitative rules are needed
to cope with many facets of the problem.
For the present, empirical rules and much ad hoc testing must be employed to
produce designs that are efficient and have adequate fatigue life.
Damage tolerant features must be incorporated to reduce the likelihood of
catastrophic failures in service.
Adequate structural integrity depends critically on monitoring usage and careful
inspections for fatigue damage.
Recommended Actions:
1. Conduct continued research to produce quantitative design rules that account
adequately for the many parameters affecting fatigue beh.vior of practical
structural configurations operating under r:.i--esentative dings in practical
environments.
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2. Develop automatic computer systems for systematizing and condensing huge
quantities of fatigue data into a form useful to designers.
3. Sponsor the generation of additional data on fatigue behavior, on fatigue crack
propagation and residual strength as needed to characterize the behavior of key
materials for aerospace structural applications.
4. Develop improved methods for anticipating and monitoring service loadings in
individual aircraft.
5. Develop methods of assuring adequate resistance to fatigue crack propagation
and adequate residual static strength in the presence of damage for practical
hardware.
6. Develop adequate methods of inspecting for damage in real hardware in service
and means for setting inspection intervals.
7. Develop reliable methods for conducting fatigue evaluation tests of complete
structures within practical time schedules.
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FATIGUE AT HIGH TEMPERATURES AND THERMAL FATIGUE
by J. C. Freche and S. S. Manson
NASA Lewis Research Center
Background
At high temperatures, above 0.4 or 0. 5 of the absolute melting point, materials
under sustained load will continue to flow plastically or creep, whereas they would not
at lower temperatures. The process of failure under repeated cyclic stressing at
these high temperatures thus changes from the usual cycle-dependent (and time-
independent) failure process of low temperature "fatigue" to include the time-dependent
effects of creep, relaxation, and even metallurgical structure changes.
Often the cyclic stresses or strains are not introduced by repeated mechanical
loading, but rather they result from temperature gradients in the parts induced by
temperature cycling of the device. The failure mechanism resulting from cyclic stresses
introduced by thermai gradients is called "thermal fatigue" and greatly complicates
the problem of design. If the designer were to attempt to calculate the cycles to failure
as a basis for his design, he must be able to go all the way from the expected tempera-
ture changes in the environment through the steps to crack initiation, as follows:
Calculation Material properties
Environment
- Conductivity, specific heat
Metal temperature
- Thermal expansion coefficient
Cyclic strain
- Elastic modulus, yield strength, creep rate
Cyclic stress
- Ductility, tensile strength, creep rupture
Cycles to crack initiation strength
In addition, every time he considers a material property in this process, he must deal
with a situation wherein the properties of his material are changing with temperature.
We are just beginning to obtain an understandung of the problem. Much of the
fatigue work at Lewis, for example, is directed toward obtaining the necessary under-
standing of the complex factors involved and, of course, devising means for predicting
material behavior under such complex loading conditions in advance of service. A
reasonable understanding exists of the problem of isothermal, high temperature fatigue.
For preliminary design purposes the "10 percent rule" (ref. 1) provides a good rule of
thumb for predicting uniaxial low cycle fatigue behavior in advance of service, keeping
in mind the limitations as discussed in reference 1. For more complex loading
conditions involving varying temperature and stress, or for applications to metallur-
gically time and load sensitive materials, a linear damage life-fracture rule, together
with the use of a cyclic creep rupture test (refs. 2 and 3), provide the designers with
useful guidelines in predicting material behavior. However, much more research and
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development work is required for a better understanding of the interaction effects of the
many variables involved, such as the role of frequency, compressive stresses, mean
stresses, hold times, and load versus strain cycling. Next, the validity of the
application of these techniques to aerospace hardware items, such as turbine blades,
must be verified under simulated engine operating conditions. Since the problem of
high-temperature fatigue in its broadest sense involves a combination of many individual
factors such as fatigue, thermally induced stresses, mechanically applied stresses,
and creep, its solution is dependent in part upon our understanding of both creep and
fatigue mechanisms. Consequently continued research in each of these areas, together
with research directed at the total problem is a necessity.
Selection of Materials
The tests being used for isothermal high temperature fatigue have been fairly
well agreed upon by many of the laboratories in this country. These laboratories use
electronically controlled equipment for conducting both load cycling and strain cycling
tests. The ASTM E-9 Committee on Fatigue is involved with testing procedures, and
its recommendations will eventually result in standards regarding test procedures. A
recent ASTM Special Technical Publication (ref. 4) describes the latest techniques.
Isothermal high-temperature data may be found in a number of publications and hand-
books. Some of the better sources of data compilation are contained in references
5 to 7. Additional data can also be found in many reports in the open literature.
However, relative to the availability of room-temperature fatigue data, the isothermal
high-temperature fatigue data are limited.
In the area of thermal fatigue (fatigue resulting from cyclic variation of tempera-
ture) a variety of tests are being used, usually depending upon the preference of the
investigator. These include fluidized bed tests (sometimes involving Glenny-type
specimens; see refs. 8 and 9) and completely restrained thermal cycling. The E-9
Committee is also considering recommendations in the area of thermal fatigue testing.
As to availability of thermal fatigue data, these are even more limited than isothermal
high-termperature fatigue data. Also, there is little correlation possible of the
existing thermal fatigue data because these data were generally obtained in different
tests and under widely different test conditions. A limited compilation of thermal
fatigue data (in the sense of ranking high temperature materials with respect to thermal
fatigue resistance) has been obtained by Glenny et al. (refs. 8 and 9). Also in this area,
considerable amounts of data are being generated both at Lewis and under Lewis-
sponsored contracts such as at IITRI (ref. 10). Here extensive thermal fatigue
testing of virtually the entire gamut of superalloys, including the most advanced, is
being done both to provide a ranking of their thermal fatigue resistance and to provide
data for our analytical studies. These data will, of course, become available in NASA
and NASA-contractor reports.
Data for Hardware Design
I n addition to such data as have been described, there are undoubtedly data in the
files of industrial users of high temperature materials. To be used, they must be
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considered in the light of their possible limitations for the particular design application.
As to statistical aspects relative to both high-temperature isothermal, low cycle fatigue
and thermal fatigue data, there appears to be a fairly high degree of data reproducibility
if the material processing and testing conditions from specimen to specimen are kept
the same. This is true to a much greater degree than for high cycle fatigue data where
flaws in the material can be instrumental in producing strain concentrations which can
markedly exceed the relatively low externally applied nominal strain and cause drastic
reductions in life compared with a specimen without flaws. Thus, although large
amounts of data in these areas (particularly thermal fatigue) are not available, the
need for data in the amounts that would be required to establish a fatigue limit, for
example, in a statistically satisfactory manner, is not so great.
For low-cycle strain cycling fatigue in the creep range, and for thermal fatigue
involving temperatures in the creep range, additional data now not commonly obtained
will be required. Notable among these are short-time creep-rupture properties,
tensile properties at high strain rates, and relaxation properties. Current practice
is to use extrapolation procedures to determine the short-time (1 hr or less) properties
required in the calculations; however, there is no reason why the data could not be
directly generated for the materials of interest. Tensile and creep properties at high
strain rates and relaxation properties are required because both factors enter into the
determination of stresses at the strain rates developed during a thermal fatigue cycle.
Data of this type must be obtained on materials of interest, particularly materials
involving time-temperature instabilities. Also, methods must be established for
correlating such data so that they can be represented in concise form and for extrap-
olation to conditions other than those used in the particular tests conducted during data
generation. Possibly the time-temperature parameter concepts previously used to
correlate creep and rupture data can be applied for this purpose.
Materials Specifications
No specifications for thermal fatigue resistance are called for in ordering
materials from a producer. The fluidized bed test is the closest to what may be con-
sidered a standard today. The results of testing Glenny-type specimens (1-5/8 inch
diameter with a 0. 010-inch edge radius) in fluidized beds are sometimes included in a
tabulation of data by producers of high temperature alloys (notably the International
Nickel Company). A number of these facilities cxist throughout the country, and
comparisons of thermal fatigue resistance among alloys is sometimes possible.
Insofar as isothermal high temperature fatigue specifications are concerned, the
cost of conducting these tests usually precludes their insertion into specifications.
They may, however, be called for as a final means of judging whether a material lot
is suitable (i. e., if it falls short in other conventionally asked for requirements such
as tensile strength, grain size, etc.).
Design Methods
Design methods that have been previously described, such as the "10 percent
rule" for isothermal, high temperature fatigue, are readily applicable by designers.
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Further detailed procedures for other aspects of design for high temperature service
are described in various texts such as reference 11. For the more complex loading
conditions, the techniques are not well established. For most design applications, the
input to design problems is not always well defined. (This is particularly true for the
temperature distributions.) Consequently critical tests are usually needed for complex
hardware to ensure suitable design capability. However, as the technology advances,
certain analytical procedures can be used to replace direct testing. Creep, strain-
rate effects, and relaxation can be incorporated into the equations of equilibrium and
compatibility which describe the thermal and mechanical loading processes. The
measured creep and relaxation properties can be incorporated into the stress-strain
relations to permit more accurate solutions. The basic methods would be the same as
those described in references 2 and 10, but more accurate determination of stresses
and strains would be possible by this approach.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Deficiencies in the technology: From the standpoint of material selection and component
design, the following deficiencies can be recognized in the technology base:
1. A more complete understanding must be obtained of the interaction effects of the
many variables involved in complex high temperature cyclic loading applications.
This is necessary so that techniques, capable of accurately predicting material
behavior of parts subjected to high temperature fatigue in its broadest sense,
can be developed.
2. Additional data, particularly thermal fatigue data, for the newer, high temperature
materials are needed to assist designers in making material selection.
Recommended actions:
1. As a first approximation to estimating isothermal, high temperature, low cycle
fatigue life, the 10 percent rule is a useful approach. It is useful as a guide to
designers when complete data on stress and strain history cannot readily be obtained
or when simplified analysis is the only possibility open to the designer.
2. For somewhat more complex loading conditions involving varying temperatures and
stress, or for application to metallurgically time and load sensitive materials, a
linear damage life-fraction rule, together with the use of a cyclic creep rupture
test, will provide designers with useful guidelines in predicting material behavior.
3. To obtain a better understanding of the interaction effects of the many variables
involved in the very complex high temperature cyclic loading applications, a
number of studies should be made. These include determination of fatigue crack
initiation and propagation rate factors and the manner in which they are influenced
by the ratio of minimum to maximum stress, variable amplitude loading, hold
time, geometry, and environmental factors, including high temperature for various
B-9
engineering materials, as well as the determination of strain rate and relaxation
effects for engineering materials at high temperatures. These factors can then
be incorporated in design practice and significantly advance the science of fail-
safe design procedures, the practicality of which has already been augmented by
the development of Fracture Mechanics Laws for crack growth.
4. More thermal fatigue data should be generated for high temperature materials
using the highly efficient fluidized bed method that has been employed in the NASA
sponsored investigation at IITRI.
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CREEP
by J. C. Freche and S. S. Manson
NASA Lewis Research Center
Background
Present theories of the mechanical behavior of metals and alloys are inadequate
to describe quantitatively the behavior of a real material during plastic deformation.
However, empirical formulations have yielded practical methods for correlating material
behavior and predicting the long-time properties with reasonable accuracy. The
expressions are concerned mainly with the strain-time relation, the effect of tempera-
ture, and with the dependence on stress. When used judiciously and with a realization
of the magnitude of possible errors, they furnish readily applicable techniques for
summarizing many data in convenient form for purposes of comparison and for
improving the accuracy of extrapolations. Some of the parameters, such as the
Larson-Miller and the Manson-Haferd parameter, have become integral parts of the
materials engineer's and designer's lexicon. These, as well as other time-tempera-
ture parameters are adequately described in textbooks and design manuals. Shorthand
methods of applying the parameters are often available in nomograph form from
suppliers of materials.
In the case of uniaxial creep, practical engineering has developed from useful,
simple laws which have an extensive generality and a close relation to an underlying
theory. This is not to say that further research and development work is not needed
in the area of creep. Certainly more work is required to understand fully the roles
of the effects of atmosphere, size and shape, and temperatures above those at which
oxidation occurs. Special effects associated with notches have been observed and
only partially explained (i.e., effect of notches on the creep rupture life of nickel-base
sheet in the 1000 ° to 1200OF range). Also, although biaxial tension-tension (pressurized
cylinders) has been extensively investigated, further work under other multiaxial loading
conditions is needed. Because of the general complexity of the latter type of investiga-
tions, such investigations should be more of an exploratory nature. If pronounced
effects are found, these studies should be pursued. For design of aerospace structures,
more data and a better understanding of primary (first stage) creep is desirable.
For example, upon reentry, the sudden incidence of high temperature can lead to first
stage creep uin some structural members. How to predict the effect of repeated condi-
tions of this kind on the primary creep curve of various materials is of great
importance to the designer.
Of course, further work should be and is being done to check the validity of the
various time-temperature parameters in predicting long-time creep-rupture life.
Along this line, there is a special ASTM Committee that has been formed for the
express purpose of setting up standards for use of time-temperature parameters. The
committee consists of S. S. Manson (Lewis Research Center), W. E. Leyda (Babcock
and Wilcox), R. M. Goldhoff (General Electric), and George Smith (Consultant to
Materials Properties Council). Also, in this latter connection, a station-function
analysis proposed by Manson and coworkers (ref. 1) can provide a basis for this
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ievaluation. The approach relies on a generalization of the concept of time-temperature
parameters in which higher temperature is substituted for longer time in generating
the data from which extrapolations are made. By introducing a station-function
procedure, the method applies an optimization procedure for seeking out the most
pertinent parameter whether or not it is among those in common use.
Selection of Materials
Test methods for uniaxial creep are well established, and equipment is generally
available that is adequate for obtaining data for design purposes over the entire useful
temperature spectrum. Test methods and techniques are well defined (recommended
ASTM practice).
A considerable amount of creep data exists, but these data are frequently buried
in the archives of companies that use the materials in question. These come to light
occasionally as a result of a particular development program which the company wishes
to publicize, or because of specific requests for information, or as incidental parts
of reports which deal with major developments such as the SST which require the use
of advanced materials. For example, engine manufacturers, when they have a
proprietary interest, develop more data for an alloy than the origianl alloy producer.
A case in point is MAR-M200, used by Pratt and Whitney as a bucket material. This
alloy was used in the development of controlled solidification casting techniques and
showed substantial strength and ductility increases when directionally solidified.
Piearcey, Ver Synder, and others have written at least a half dozen papers in which
MAR-M200 is compared with other materials. Actually Pratt and Whitney generated
much of the data on the original alloy to use as a base in comparisons with the
directionally solidified versions. Sometimes reports by contractors (such as Pratt and
Whitney or General Electric) made to contracting agencies contain design data obtained
with advanced materials (i. e., creep data up to 10000 hr for materials such as IN-100,
Waspaloy, TD-nickel). Thus, it is our experience that a substantial amount of creep
data exists even for advanced materials.
Much of the data obtained by industrial organizations probably never is made
available for general use. There are, however, a number of positive steps being
taken which project a somewhat brighter picture and which indicate that a great deal
of material is available and much more is being obtained. An important case in point
is the Aerospace Structural Metals Handbook. This is constantly being up-dated to
include not only the latest alloys, but also additional properties on already listed
materials. In this handbook there is a Special Considerations Section associated with
each material, which, if studied by designers, would guide them in its use and serve
as a useful supplement to the creep data that are provided. Not to be overlooked are
the supplemental DMIC reports which frequently contain creep data on even the most
advanced materials. These sheets appear every few months. Some of the compre-
hensive listings are those of references 2 to 4.
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Data for Hardware Design
Much of the creep data, especially for the newer materials, is not statistically
founded, but scatterbands and sufficient data have been obtained on most old-line
materials to establish minimum properties. These creep data are available in the open
literature, from DMIC, in references 2 to 4, and in some cases from the alloy producer.
Data on strain-rate effects and on relaxation are very limited, however, especially for
the new materials of current interest.
Specifically in the area of creep, the Metal Properties Council, which is a joint
activity of ASME, ASTM, ASM and various industrial groups, is currently sponsoring
the acquisition of long-time data (up to 100000 hr) for several aluminum alloys. These
data are being obtained not only to characterize the materials thoroughly, but also to
check the validity of extrapolation procedures and various time-temperature parameters.
Also, the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (AGARD) has instituted a worldwide program to obtain creep data
on selected high temperature materials. One of the purposes was to determine the
degree of agreement among data obtained by participating laboratories and establish
statistically reliable data.
Materials Specifications
Creep requirements are included by users of such materials in a number of cast
as well as wrought high temperature alloy specifications. These are negotiated and
agreed upon by both consumer and supplier. For example, a Pratt and Whitney speci-
fication for B-1900 (PWA-663), a nickel-base superalloy, calls for certain minimum
rupture lives at specified test conditions. It also calls for a minimum elongation
measured not more than 2 hours before rupture. Such requirements are of course
documented in materials specifications of major users such as Pratt and Whitney and
General Electric. Discussions with suppliers of superalloys indicate that such require-
ments are appearing in all the recent specifications submitted by purchasers. It is
interesting to note that in discussing specifications with a representative of Wyman-
Gordon, a major supplier of high temperature materials to turbojet engine manufacturers,
it was pointed out that superalloys are not purchased according to Aerospace Materials
Specifications for engine applications because these specifications are not sufficiently
restrictive.
Design Methods
As discussed previously, in considering the technology there are a number of
design procedures and methods available which can enable the average designer to
proceed with rational hardware designs. These are available in many books and
publications. Among those that provide treatments of many facets of design involving
creep are references 5 to 9. The basic equations for equilibrium and compatibility in
creep problems are well known (e.g., refs. 5 and 6); however, more sophisticated
stress-strain relations, taking into account plasticity, strain-rate effects, and relax-
ation effects, are required to obtain accurate calculations of stress and strain, both
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of which appear to be of importance in thermal fatigue and other creep applications.
New techniques may be required for accurate solution of the resulting equations, for
example, the finite-element approach.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Deficiencies in the technology: From the standpoint of material selection and component
design the following deficiencies can be recognized in the technology base:
1. Availability of long-time creep data (30000 to 100000 hr) is limited. This is
particularly true for the materials of current interest.
2. Data on strain rate effects and relaxation are very limited for virtually all
materials.
3. Data under multiaxial loading conditions other than biaxial tension-tension is
required.
Recommended actions:
1. Additional long-time creep data acquisition such as that currently being sponsored
by the Metal Properties Council should be encouraged.
2. Check the validity of extrapolation procedures, that is, determine how short-time
data can be used in the most effective and reliable manner to predict results of
time-consuming tests. In this connection, further participation of NASA in, and
continuance of, the activities of the High Temperature Creep Testing Program of
the AGARD Structures and Materials Panel is recommended. Also, the NASA
station-function minimum commitment approach, in which the "real behavior"
of the material is used to establish the functional relations that apply to that
particular material, should be further evaluated as a means of more confidently
permitting short-time data at high temperature to be used for long-time
extrapolations.
3. The interrelation of strain rate effects and relaxation should be investigated with
a view toward developing a workable hypothesis for accounting for prior stress,
temperature, and strain history in life prediction. A program of this type is
being initiated at the NASA Lewis Research Center.
4. Exploratory investigations to develop creep data under complex multiaxial loading
conditions should be initiated to determine if any pronounced effects occur that
are not predictable by existing theories.
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FRACTURE TOUGHNESS
by W. F. Brown, Jr.
NASA Lewis Research Center
Background
In the context used here, the term fracture toughness refers to a measure of a
metallic material's resistance to unstable propagation of cracks under conditions of
monotonically increasing load. The propagating crack might have its origin in a flaw
initially present in the metal, or might arise from a fatigue or corrosion induced crack.
The formulation of a rigorous definition of crack stability is a very difficult problem,
and for present purposes it will be assumed that a crack is stable if its continued
extension requires increasing load in a neutral environment. Materials with high
fracture toughness exhibit considerable plastic flow around the tip of an advancing
crack. This plastic zone increases in size with crack extension, occupies a substantial
part of the thickness, and extends well ahead of the crack. It is the increasing energy
demand of this plastic region which keeps the crack stable and requires significant
increases in load for continued crack propagation. Structural failures in materials
exhibiting this behavior generally show evidence of gross yielding, and cracks may
be self-arresting such as is sometimes observed in the fracture of pressurized tanks.
These are typical ductile failures. In contrast, materials with low fracture toughness
exhibit crack tip plastic zones which are very small compared with the crack length and
thickness of the part containing the crack. These materials show little crack extension
under rising load and an abrupt onset of unstable crack propagation. The unstable crack
then runs at high speeds feeding on the stored elastic energy in the part. Structural
failures in such materials are usually catastrophic with much shattering and may occur
at loads well below the conventional tensile yield strength. These are typical brittle
failures.
The theory of brittle failure has developed to the point where it is possible to
design laboratory tests which provide a quantitative measure of fracture toughness under
conditions where linear elastic mechanics can be applied (refs. 1 to 4). This field of
structural mechanics is commonly known as linear elastic fracture mechanics, and
the index of fracture toughness is designated as plane strain fracture toughness (Kic).
If a material is sufficiently brittle, in theory it would be possible to establish
the design loads on the basis of linear elastic fracture mechanics analysis and the
material property Kic. However, in most cases it is impossible to fix the crack
size with a high degree of certainty, and under such conditions elastic fracture
mechanics can only provide an estimate of load carrying ability, the usefulness of which
will depend on the accuracy of the assumptions concerning crack sizes. Plane strain
fracture toughness values are a valuable guide in material selection for critical
applications and in certain circumstances can be used as an aid in the design of proof
tests. Unfortunately linear elastic fracture mechanics has been applied in situations
where the crack tip deformations are far too high to permit useful accuracy in the
analysis. There is a definite need for objective education in this respect. The
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development of elastic-plastic fracture mechanics is necessary to provide quantitative
information concerning the behavior of cracks in tough materials. Research is pro-
gressing slowly in this area because the work is difficult both conceptually and
mathematically. At the present time there is little advantage in attempting to increase
this effort which is largely at the stage of exploring various models of the plastic zone
development around cracks. In the meantime it appears possible to use cracked
specimens in suitable laboratory tests as an aid in the design of proof tests. However,
this approach has not been developed to the point where rules for its application can be
written.
Selection of Materials
Many different methods have been used to evaluate the fracture toughness of
materials. Many are highly specialized tests that have been developed for particular
applications and might be called "model tests" in that they attempt to incorporate the
major embrittling features of the service environments. Noteworthy are the low
temperature impact tests developed by NRL for the selection of steels for ship hull
construction. ASTM Standards exist for two of the most popular of these tests, the
Nil Ductility Transition Temperature (NDT, ref. 5) and the Drop Weight Tear Test
(DWTT, ref. 6). The aircraft industry makes extensive use of model tests, and some
become quite complicated in their approach to the actual application. All such tests
suffer from their very specialization in that they are useful only in a restricted set of
circumstances. Much simpler "screening tests," such as the Charpy V impact or mild
notch bar tension test, are frequently used by the alloy producer as indicators of
relative embrittlement. These tests have the advantage of small size and easy perfor-
mance; the disadvantage is that the quantity being measured is difficult to interpret in
terms of the material fracture characteristics under the influence of cracks.
More recently, attempts have been made to develop screening tests which are
more realistic in that they make use of the substantial knowledge developed over the
past 10 years on the fracture behavior of high strength materials. The ASTM E-24
Committee on the Fracture Testing of Metals has issued Methods of Test for determina-
tion of plane strain fracture toughness, KI (ref. 4), and for sharp notch tension testing
of high strength sheet materials (ref. 7). As mentioned previously, the former test
method provides a quantitative measurement of the resistance to crack propagation
under static load but is restricted in application to relatively brittle materials and
requires rather sophisticated instrumentation and analysis procedures. The latter test
method was designed primarily for sheet materials (up to 1/4 in. thick) and is restricted 3
in application to materials having yield strength to density ratios above 700000 psi/lb in.
(about 200 ksi in steel). At the present time we are attempting to revise E338 in such a
way that its applicability will be extended to materials of lower strength and larger
section size. In making this revision we are working in close contact with representa-
tives of the SAE-AMS groups, who have direct need for such tests. In addition, E-24 is
planning to write recommended practices for the testing of surface flawed specimens
of a type which has been widely used in the aerospace industry for material selection.
It is important to remember that all these screening tests represent various
degrees of compromise and that no one test will serve all purposes. The main object is
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to develop as small a number of tests as is needed to do the jobs at hand and to
characterize carefully the tests so that their results will not be ambiguous or subject
to variations in test technique of data analysis. This, then, is a matter for standardiza-
tion, and the need for this standardization is well recognized by all who are associated
with ASTM E-24, AIA, and the SAE-AMS groups. The necessary research is underway
at NASA laboratories and at several industrial organizations.
Data for Hardware Design
In order to establish minimum design properties on a sound statistical basis, it is
first necessary to standardize test procedures. This has been done in the case of the
fracture property defined in ASTM E-399-70T (ref. 4) as plane strain fracture toughness
(Kic). However, this Method of Test has not been in existence long enough to generate
a body of data sufficiently large to permit meaningful statistical analysis. Furthermore,
the Method of Test is in a tentative status and will likely undergo modification within the
next 2 years before becoming a full Standard. At the present time plane strain fracture
toughness data (KIc) conforming to ASTM E-399-70T is being put into MIL-Hdbk-5 for
information only. When sufficient "goodt" data have been generated, presumably minimum
values of Kic will be listed along with other design mechanical properties. Certainly some
index of fracture resistance, measured using a cracked specimen, should be more
meaningful to the designer than the tensile elongation or reduction in area values, which
now appear in the design mechanical property listings. In most cases these measures of
"ductility" have little to do with the performance of the material in any practical structure.
Material Specifications
The SAE-AMS specifications for high strength steels and titanium alloys often
contain a statement to the effect that a fracture toughness test should be conducted, but
leave the type of test and interpretation of the result as a matter to be established by
agreement between the purchaser and the vendor. However, it is the intention of the
SAE-AMS group to suggest suitable fracture tests based on ASTM Methods as these
become available. The SAE-AMS specifications are very comprehensive and widely
used in the aerospace industry; however, individual companies and government agencies
have their own specifications. These are in enormous volume and not well known to me.
The Air Force has begun to ask for certain minimum values of plane strain fracture
toughness (KIc) in the material specifications for high performance aircraft. The
increasing attention given to fracture properties by specification writers is basically
very desirable. However, in some cases there has been a tendency to emphasize the
measurement of plane strain fracture toughness when in fact that property cannot be
measured for the section sizes of interest, and is therefore of unknown practical
significance in determining structural performance. In fact, for most alloys the
specification of a minimum value of Kic is premature because as yet there is insuffi-
cient valid data to establish a sound statistical basis for such specifications.
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Design Methods
Linear elastic fracture mechanics and its associated plane strain fracture
toughness (Kic) values can provide a valuable tool for the designer in his fracture
control and proof testing programs, but only when the crack in the structure is limited
to conditions of small scale yielding and plane strain constraint. These circumstances
are encountered in the fracture of sufficiently heavy sections of structural materials.
However, there is an increasing tendency to apply linear elastic fracture mechanics to
situations where the basic assumptions of the theory are not even remotely approached
because of extensive plastic flow near the crack tip. It is sometimes argued that, even
though these assumptions are grossly violated, the toughness values measured and the
conclusions reached about structural integrity are "conservative." But experience
shows that what may be conservative in one situation may be overly optimistic in
another. Unfortunately the fracture behavior of metallic materials outside the linear
elastic range of nominal loading is poorly understood and is influenced by many factors
that are not taken into account in elastic fracture theories. These factors do sometimes
compensate for one another in such a way that on the basis of limited experience one may
be led to believe that elastic fracture mechanics can be extended well into the plastic
range. Such extension is, at best, unwise and in some cases may be dangerous because at
the present time there is no way of predicting the direction or the magnitude of the
errors involved.
At the present time it would be well to avoid the involvement of linear elastic
fracture mechanics concepts. in design criteria except in those cases where there is
ample evidence to support the inherent assumptions that fracture will be controlled by
small scale yielding and plane strain conditions.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Deficiencies in the Technology: From the standpoint of material selection and component
design, the following deficiencies can be recognized in the technology:
1. Experience that has developed over the last 2 years indicates that certain modifications
are necessary to the existing ASTM E-24 Tentative Method of Test for Plane Strain
(KIc) Fracture Toughness of Metallic Materials (E399-70T).
2. For many materials of current interest, sufficient information on fracture behavior
has not been developed using the standard test methods now available.
3. Suitable standardized screening tests are not available for the selection of materials
on the basis of their mixed mode fracture characteristics.
4. An elastic-plastic fracture mechanics has not been developed which would permit the
"quantitative" measurement of a fracture index outside the range of application of
linear elastic fracture mechanics.
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5. The relation between fracture properties and conventional strength properties is
poorly understood.
6. The relation between metallurgical structure (e.g., distribution and types of
nonmetallic inclusions) is not know for major high strength alloys systems.
7. Standard methods for the evaluation of the fracture behavior of extremely brittle
materials, such as ceramics and intermetallics, are not available.
8. There is very little experimental evidence relating the behavior of cracks in
components with double curvature (e.g., spherical vessels) as compared with the
behavior of cracks in flat plates.
9. Empirical methods are available which would permit the design of proof tests where
linear elastic fracture mechanics cannot be applied.
Recommended actions: The following recommended actions should be of immediate help
to the alloy producer and designer. These actions do not relate to items 4, 7, and 8
above because remedies to those deficiencies are subjects for long-range research which
certainly should be supported.
1. Modifications to E399-70T should result from an in-house program now underway at
NASA-Lewis. However, additional work concerning the size effects in fracture
should be encouraged.
2. The qualification of screening tests now under development at NASA-Lewis will
require the establishment of cooperative test programs. These programs should
receive adequate support, perhaps through NASA or Air Force contract activities.
3. The development of a background of fracture data will require the establishment of
long-range plans on the part of NASA and the Air Force for continuous support of
this type of work. In the past such support has been inadequate and sporadic.
4. The ASTM now has a Task Group under Committee E-24 charged with development
of fracture tests for very brittle materials including beryllium. The necessary
research programs have been outlined, but no funds are available for them.
5. An experimental program should be initiated that would permit the behavior of
cracks in spherical vessels to be compared with cracks in flat panels. This
should include a range of materials with widely differing toughnesses and tensile
strengths.
6. The general procedure for design of proof tests outside the limits of elastic fracture
mechanics seems fairly straighforward. What is needed is an experimental program
which would explore the limitations of such a procedure.
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7. There is an increasing tendency to include KIC values in material specifications
and to incorporate linear elastic fracture mechanics into hardware design. These
actions are desirable only under a rather restricted set of circumstances and
should be preceded by a careful study of the problem by experts who can advise
whether the specifications or design requirements are feasible on the basis of present
day knowledge.
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STRESS CORROSION
byW. F. Brown, Jr.
NASA Lewis Research Center
Background
Stress corrosion in the sense used here refers to the localized attack of an
aggressive environment on a metallic alloy in the presence of external loads or internal
stresses. Stress corrosion can initiate cracks which can be propagated by fatigue loads
or by static loads. If the aggressive environment is coupled with the presence of cracks
or crack-like flaws, delayed failure under static loads may be encountered. In some
cases the load below which no crack propagation is observed, even for very long
exposure times, is only a small fraction of the material's yield strength.
Until recently stress corrosion tests were carried out on smooth specimens.
The results from such tests are difficult to use in establishing safe design loads but
can be helpful to the designer in selection of materials or to the metallurgist in
development of protective coatings (ref. 1). However, smooth specimen test results
in some cases may not reveal the susceptibility to delayed failure in the presence of
cracks, and for this reason stress corrosion tests using cracked specimens have
assumed increasing importance in the aerospace industry (ref. 2). If the appropriate
specimen sizes and testing conditions are used, elastic fracture mechanics may be
applied and the results expressed in terms of stress intensity factors. This expression
has the advantage of achieving generality in terms of crack size and applied stress.
Under these circumstances, the test results are useful to the designer in providing an
indication of the load levels below which cracks will propagate very slowly or not at all.
Selection of Materials
Stress corrosion tests on smooth and cracked specimens provide the designer
with valuable tools for material selection provided that the service environment can be
suitably simulated in the laboratory. However, the testing methods as yet are very
imprecise and lack standardization. For example, bent or stretched smooth samples
are placed on the roof of an industrial building or near the sea and examined periodically
to detect the presence of cracks or complete failure. No standards exist for this
examination procedure, and, as might be expected from the normal variations in the
environment and in the crack detection procedure, a very large scatter characterizes
the results of smooth stress corrosion tests. However, with enough information it is
possible to make a judgement concerning the relative susceptibility of candidate
materials to stress corrosion cracking in a given environment. The degree of confi-
dence in such a judgement increases with the amount of long-time data available, but
these data are frequently missing because those requiring the information do not want
to wait so long. Unfortunately there is no reliable way of extrapolating such information,
nor is such a way likely to be found in the near future.
The specimens used in the delayed failure studies generally contain fatigue cracks,
and, as mentioned previously, the results can sometimes be usefully presented in terms
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of stress intensity factors. However, it should be realized that this method of data
presentation is helpful in generalizing the results only if the test conditions meet the
requirements of a plane strain fracture toughness test, and they seldom do. Many
different specimen geometries (specimen sizes and crack lengths) are in use, and,
unless the proper conditions for elastic crack stress analysis are met, there is no way
of comparing the results from tests on different geometries. Standardization is badly
needed here and is being undertaken by Committee G-1 of ASTM with the help and
advice of the members of E-24.
Compilations of stress corrosion data are badly needed. The DMIC Reviews and
the Aerospace Structural Metals Handbook contain some but not nearly enough of this
type of information. To be useful to the designer, stress corrosion data must be care-
fully selected and digested by specialists in the field and correlated with other data,
such as the static fracture properties.
Data for Hardware Design
From the foregoing discussion it is evident that stress corrosion test data as
available today will seldom be of use in setting allowable design loads. Under circum-
stances where the crack sizes are known and where linear elastic fracture mechanics
is applicable, it may be possible to obtain an upper limit of the stress intensity factor
below which delayed failure in a corrosive environment would not occur in the expected
lifetime of the structure. However, the presence of cyclic loads can greatly complicate
the problem, and meaningful data can be obtained only if the laboratory test closely
simulates the major features of the service loading conditions and environment.
Material Specifications and Design Methods
Requirements for stress corrosion tests using smooth specimens appear in some
SAE-AMS documents. In such cases the type of specimen, stress level, and means of
exposure are specified. The requirement is then stated that no evidence of stress
corrosion shall be evident following a prescribed exposure time. Individual companies
have their own specifications concerning the stress corrosion resistance of metallic
materials, and these vary widely in type and scope. The lack of standardization greatly
hampers one who attempts to relate one specification to another.
There are no design methods specifically related to stress corrosion. This
problem is complicated by the effects of fabrication variables which can introduce resid-
ual stresses. As explained in the section Data for Hardware Design, in some instances
it may be possible to derive an upper limit on the stress intensity factor which can be
applied without experiencing delayed failure in the presence of cracks and aggressive
environments. However, the designer generally handles the stress corrosion problem
by material selection and, where possible, by providing protective coatings.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Deficiencies in the technology: From the standpoint of material selection and design,
the following deficiencies can be recognized in the technology:
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1. Improvements in the precision of crack measurement would be desirable for
the presently used stress corrosion tests that employ smooth specimens.
2. Standardization is badly needed for stress corrosion tests which employ cracked
specimens. Without such standardization the test results have no general
usefulness in either material selection or design.
3. Compilations of stress corrosion data prepared by experts and presented in
their most readily usable form are badly needed.
Recommended actions: The following actions are recommended as being of help to
both the alloy producer and the designer:
1. Stress corrosion tests using both smooth and cracked specimens should be con-
ducted on any new combination of structural material and environment. It is
not proposed that all conceivable variations of the new environment be investigated
but rather that the extremes be explored. For example, if sodium chloride
aqueous solutions are involved, the extremes in expected concentrations should
be investigated. There is sufficient technical knowledge available today to specify
the types of specimens required to characterize an environment as either non-
aggressive or potentially dangerous. There is, however, no generally recognized
way of quantifying the risk without extensive tests tailored to the particular
application.
2. Standardization activity for cracked stress corrosion tests is already underway
within the ASTM Committee structure. The development of suitable test methods
will require experimental programs that are designed to establish the influence
of specimen dimensional variables. These programs will need support.
3. The DMIC and the Aerospace Structural Metals Handbook should be encouraged to
emphasize stress corrosion information and to attempt to relate the susceptibility
of stress corrosion to other mechanical properties, such as the strength level of
the alloy.
4. Consideration should be given to establishing a "Data Center for Corrosion" that
would employ the services of experts in making an analysis and presentation of
the voluminous amount of data now being generated, including data already in
existence in the literature. Such an activity will ultimately be necessary because
the present sources providing compilations will run out of capacity.
5. Following the establishment of standard test methods, continuous data generating
porgrams should be established that would feed data to those making the compilations.
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HYDROGEN EMBRITTLEMENT
by W. F. Brown, Jr.
NASA Lewis Research Center
Background
Hydrogen can be a bad actor when introduced into many metals because it can
greatly reduce their load-carrying capacity. In classical hydrogen embrittlement,
hydrogen is in solid solution and is introduced by electrolytic charging processes, acid
pickling, or by corrosion reactions. Hydrogen introduced in these ways can cause
delayed failure under static load in many high strength alloys, and the embrittling effect
observed increases with an increase in the severity of the stress concentration (ref. 1).
The presence of gaseous hydrogen can reduce the load-carrying capacity by increasing
the rate of crack propagation in static and cyclic loading for certain titanium and nickel
base alloys, as well as in nearly all high strength steels (ref. 2). The magnitude of
the embirttlement depends on the temperature and pressure, with substantial effects
being observed at ambient laboratory conditions for high strength steels. Recent tests
by Boeing show that a large embrittlement of the nickel base alloy Inco 718 occurs at
70OF when cracked specimens are subjected to sustained load in 1400 psi hydrogen (ref.
3).
If high temperature and high pressure are present simultaneously, the hydrogen
may react with elements in the metal to produce a general disintegration. This
phenomenon is more properly called hydrogen attack and in steels is the result of
reaction between hydrogen and carbon to produce methane which collects at the grain
boundaries. Pressure buildup at these points can cause blistering and general internal
destruction of the metal.
There is an enormous volume of literature relating to classical hydrogen
embrittlement, and ways have been developed for controlling the plating and pickling
processes for commonly used alloys so that the risk of hydrogen embrittlement should
be very small (ref. 1). However, tests for susceptibility to this type of hydrogen
embrittlement have not been standardized. This makes judging the relative sensitivity
of different alloys difficult unless a broad background of practical experience exists.
At present ASTM is attempting to develop the necessary test methods that will permit
such standardization. Consideration is being given to both machine notched and fatigue
cracked specimens.
Various tests have been proposed for sorting materials regarding their suscepti-
bility to gaseous hydrogen embrittlement, but the field is so new that no standardization
activities have been started. Test methods using smooth specimens have been developed
by Rocketdyne under NASA contract and have proved very useful in investigations of the
effect of high pressure (10 000 psi) hydrogen. Research programs using cracked
specimens subjected to high pressure hydrogen are underway at Gulf Research and
U.S. Steel Company, but the data are apparently not available to the public. One
method that holds promise for overcoming the deleterious effect of high pressure
hydrogen in gas storage vessels is the introduction of a liner (e. g., aluminum) which
in itself is not affected by the hydrogen. Hydrogen gas which diffuses through the liner
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could then be vented to the atmosphere by a suitable system of narrow grooves cut into
the inner wall of the vessel. This procedure is feasible during vessel fabrication, but
probably not practical for vessels that are already in use. In such cases, the gas
pressure should be reduced to the lowest value consistent with the flow requirements,
and the vessels should be subjected to as few pressure cycles as possible. The problem
of avoiding hydrogen attack is largely one of alloy selection although design tricks such
as the use of liners may be of value in certain cases.
A very serious problem may be encountered if high strength steels, titanium
alloys, or nickel base alloys are used without protection in critical parts subjected to
hydrogen gas. The effects of temperature, gas pressure, and load rate need to be
investigated for candidate alloys considered for any proposed hydrogen fueled engine.
The data outlining the susceptibility of various materials to hydrogen embrittle-
ment through electric charging is adequately documented both in DMIC and in the
Aerospace Structural Metals Handbook. The effects of gaseous hydrogen are poorly
defined at present but the available data are well documented by DMIC.
Conclusions and Recommendations
As previously discussed, the possibility of failure by classical hydrogen embrittle-
ment can generally be eliminated through proper selection of materials and fabrication
procedures. There is little excuse for problems arising from the introduction of
hydrogen by electrolytic charging because the means for avoiding this are well known.
However, occasionally a service part will fail because of this type of hydrogen
embrittlement, and the question then arises as to what can be done to avoid failure in
similar parts which may also contain hydrogen. In such cases the suspected hardware
should be removed from service and subjected to a suitable baking treatment, and
when necessary this should be preceded by stripping off the plating.
The protection of stroage vessels from embrittlement caused by high pressure
hydrogen at ambient temperatures is possible by the use of liners which should be
incorporated in all new designs. Vessels which cannot be lined should be operated at
reduced pressure. Unfortunately the degree of stress reduction is not easy to specify
and will depend on the material. Experts should be consulted in each case.
The problem of gaseous hydrogen embrittlement thus far has been of major
concern to the aerospace industry only in ground storage vessels for high pressure
hydrogen. However, hydrogen fueled jet engines might be in serious trouble if criticai
parts were subjected to gaseous hydrogen. A great deal more information is needed to
define the simultaneous effects of pressure, temperature, and load rate on the
embrittlement of candidate alloys for such applications.
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OXIDATION
by H. B. Probst
NASA Lewis Research Center
Background
For the purpose of this discussion, oxidation is defined as the chemical reaction
of a material with oxygen at elevated temperatures. Propulsion systems, primarily
turbine engines, are currently the most important application of structural materials
at elevated temperatures. In the future, the space shuttle will represent another
significant application.
Oxidation per se has not been a frequently observed failure mode for "high
strength structural materials" because such materials, in the usual connotation of the
phrase (e.g., steels), have adequate oxidation resistance in the temperature regime
where their high strength is utilized. However, when we combine high strength with
high temperatures and speak of high-temperature, high-strength structural materials,
oxidation does become important. Materials in this category would include superalloys,
refractory metals, and dispersion strengthened alloys that retain their usable strength
to temperatures so high that their oxidation resistance is wanting. Even in these cases,
oxidation per se may not be the failure mode, but the accelerating effect that oxidation
might have on other failure modes, such as thermal fatigue and stress rupture, is of
concern. The following remarks are then directed at these high-temperature, high-
strength structural materials.
There are many features of gas-metal reactions which are not fully understood,
particularly from a mechanistic point of view. On the other hand, many facets of
oxidation are sufficiently well understood so that, given the proper evaluation tests,
useful design data could be generated. Since oxidation has not been a truly life-limiting
design factor in the past, there has been little effort to obtain design-type data. Thus
the question arises as to how much understanding is required in order to allow the
generation of design data. For the purpose of designing a stressed high temperature
structural component, the designer would be interested in two questions: (1) is the
oxidation resistance of the material sufficient so that it will survive at temperature
for the expected life time, and (2) during this expected lifetime, will the effects of
oxidation have degraded the mechanical behavior of the component and to what degree?
These questions can be answered by conducting the proper tests. Such tests can be
devised and conducted today. However, there is not sufficient basic knowledge to allow
the number and type of such tests to be truly minimized; instead tests must be run that
simulate the hardware environment as closely as possible.
Selection of Materials
A designer would be hard pressed to find good comparative data in the literature
of today to make an intelligent selection of materials on the basis of their oxidation
resistance. He could find general information that would distinguish among types of
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alloys, for example, nickel base or cobalt base, high chromium level or low chromium,
but he could not select an alloy from handbook data. This situation is not caused by the
lack of adequate test methods, but rather it arises from the difficulties of defining and
standardizing tests of general value. These difficulties arise because the oxidation
behavior of an alloy is strongly dependent on environmental factors that may be peculiar
to a given application. For example, consider the two problems of selecting alloys
(1L) for the heat shield of a reentry vehicle, and (2) for the stator vanes of a gas turbine
engine. In the reentry use, oxidation behavior at reduced pressures and under dynamic
heating is very important. However, for the engine application, the alloy behavior at
high pressure in combustion products under conditions of severe cycling is paramount.
Alloy behavior can be drastically different in these two cases. Thus, it is impossible
for one test to allow the selection of alloys for these two applications.
The most prevalent form of oxidation data in the literature gives the change in
weight per unit area of a small sample as a function of time at a set temperature. Such
data are virtually useless for the selection of an alloy for a given application for the
following reasons:
(1) The data give no insight into the absolute amount of metal consumed by the
oxidation process and the resultant loss of load-carrying ability. Only a
few investigations of the oxidation behavior of materials attempt to correlate
weight change with base metal loss or changes in microstructure.
(2) The data give no insight into the loss of load carrying ability due to internal
oxidation and changes in alloy composition.
(3) The recorded weight changes (usually weight gains) can be affected in an
unknown manner by vaporization and spalling of scales that cause weight
losses.
(4) The data are usually for short times-far short of the intended life of a
real component.
(5) The data are usually isothermal without the more realistic temperature
excursion a real component would experience.
(6) Little information is usually given regarding the surface preparation of the
samples-a factor that can have profound effects on measured weight changes.
If such information is given, the surface preparation is usually unreal for
component hardware.
More useful information would be the overall change in specimen thickness and
remaining thickness of the unaltered alloy for long times in both the isothermal and
cyclic temperature conditions, with and without stress. Such data would be of greatest
utility if obtained in air at 1 atmosphere over a range of times, temperatures, and
stresses that cover the useful life of the alloy. The same information should be gathered
for coated alloys. All the preceding should be augmented by studies of microstructural
changes and identification of oxidation products, including their morphology, and their
total emissivity.
The preceding information would allow comparison of alloys and their relative
ability to withstand a high temperature air environment. In addition, the designer would
want to know how this high temperature exposure has affected the mechanical behavior
of the candidate alloys. Here, any change in mechanical properties (strength, creep,
ductility) would be noted.
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The type of information discussed here is not available except partially in isolated
cases of individual alloys. Realistic comparisons of alloy behavior are difficult if not
impossible. In order to provide the necessary spectrum of data a great deal of
standardization of test parameters is required. For example, all alloys should be
evaluated in the same sample geometry following identical and realistic surface prepara-
tions. For cyclic testing, the cycle frequency and severity (both up-shock and down-
shock) would have to be defined. A singular and consistent technique for measuring
remaining metal thicknesses is required.
Relevant to this discussion is a current attempt by the Defense Metals Information
Center to compile a Handbook of Basic Data on Hot Corrosion and Oxidation. Such a
compilation will be useful inasmuch as it will serve as a ready reference for all
available data. However, its utility in selecting alloys for applications will be severely
limited by the lack of standardization that will be apparent in the compiled data.
Hardware Design
Data relevant to hardware design is nonexistent in the field of oxidation. Many
points relevant to this subject were discussed previously.
The use of statistical data to predict expected minimums has been applied to life
prediction for coated coupons. However, again as previously, the value of these data
is probably limited when applied to a materials selection situation because of non-
standardized testing and evaluation techniques.
Materials Specifications
An oxidation performance criterion is not contained in the specification of alloys.
An alloy that is particularly good in oxidation may be compared with other alloys in the
vendor's literature; however, such comparisons are usually too far removed from real
applications to be useful. A typical vendor brochure might show his new "alloy A" to
have only one-tenth the weight gain of "brand X alloy" after 100 hours at 1800°F. For
a designer to select alloy A based on this information for a cyclic operation in a high
velocity gas could indeed be a costly mistake.
Sometimes in development programs seeking, for example, a higher strength
alloy, the sponsor will require that the new alloy have oxidation resistance equal to or
exceeding an existing alloy under a certain set of conditions. This approach is fine for
setting a target for this particular program, but it does little to encourage the generation
of data that could eventually be used to compare many alloys.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Deficiencies in the technology: The technology for application of structural materials
in high temperature oxidizing environments is not adequate. The designer is frequently
unaware of profound changes in the mechanical properties which can result from exposure
of nominally oxidation resistant material systems to oxidizing environments. This
deficiency arises in part from a lack of sufficient information concerning the alteration
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of mechanical properties by oxidation processes and from documentation inadequacies
related to the current fund of knowledge. A great deal of published data relate to
weight gain as a function of exposure temperature and time under steady state conditions.
Such data are not useful to the designer who needs an indication of the degradation of
load-carrying capacity that can be expected, and who is often faced with a variable
temperature and load history in the actual structure. The materials engineer is
hampered in the job of estimating service performance from laboratory data by poor
documentation of test results in technical reports. Thus, material chemistry, details
of sample preparation, test environment, and residual microstructure are often
poorly defined.
Recommended actions: There are two areas where additional experimental data are
badly needed to overcome the present deficiencies in the technology base:
1. The change in the load-carrying capacity (residual strength) and thickness of
undamaged material should be determined as a function of temperature and time
of exposure to the oxidizing atmosphere. Such data should include the effect of
cyclic temperatures.
2. Velocity and pressure have an effect on the oxidation process, and for this reason
service simulating test data may be required in some cases. Examples would
include the nozzle vanes of turbojet engines that operate in high velocity and high
pressure oxidizing gas streams and the skin of reentry vehicles that operate in
air at high velocity but low pressure.
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SUBCRITICAL FLAW GROWTH
by Herbert F. Hardrath
NASA-Langley Research Center
Background
As indicated under the section "Cycle Dependent Fatigue," many efficient structures
are constructed with damage tolerant features to reduce the likelihood of catastrophic
service failures. In damage tolerant designs, the high likelihood of significant flaws or
other damage is recognized and accepted. Materials are selected, design stress levels
are adjusted and the structural details are configured to inhibit crack growth. During
service, systematic nondestructive inspections are performed to identify cracks and
corrective maintenance measures are taken to restore or improve structural strength.
Three major pieces of information are required to assure that damage tolerance
has been achieved.
1. All significant flaws must be identified, whether they were introduced during
manufacture or were developed in service by fatigue, corrosion or inadvertent
damage. In military vehicles, battle damage might also be a concern. Ade-
quate NDI procedures must be employed. This technology is discussed else-
where in this report.
2. The rate at which the crack will propagate under service conditions must be
estimated. These estimates form the basis for setting inspection intervals
and replacement schedules such that cracks do not cause catastrophic failure.
3. The progressive reduction in residual static strength must be evaluated
quantitatively to assess the likelihood of fracture under service conditions.
Another section of this appendix treats the technology on Fracture.
The remainder of this section is devoted to subcritical flaw growth.
Selection of Materials
The rate at which a crack grows in a given material is usually associated with the
linear elastic stress intensity factor K for the configuration and applied stress. Under
cyclic loadings the range in the stress intensity factor AK must exceed some threshold
value for the crack to propagate. For constant amplitude loadings, the mean value of the
factor K has a significant effect on the rate of growth. Paradoxically, several recent
investigations have shown that cracks grow more slowly under high gross stress levels
than are expected on the basis of linear elastic analyses. Simple power laws have been
proposed to correlate limited collections of data, but they cannot account for many
effects, such as the increasing rate observed as the crack length approaches its critical
value.
Although considerable research has been devoted to the study of fatigue crack
propagation, standard methods of evaluating the phenomenon have not been adopted and
no systematic catalog of properties is as yet available. Generally, the contractor for a
given vehicle is forced to generate empirical data for the materials of interest to him.
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Design Procedures
Service loadings are seldom limited to constant amplitude loadings. Thus, crack
growth under complex time histories must be accounted for. Many tests have shown
that nonlinear interaction effects are introduced, particularly following occasional high
loadings. Recent studies have led to empirical relations to predict these effects and to
a detailed study of "crack closure" even when the cracked part is under tensile load.
However, these procedures are too new to be adopted as design rules. Thus, a consider-
able number of ad hoc tests are usually required to observe crack growth under simulated
service loadings. Fortunately, most of the effects noted are in the direction of providing
longer lives than are estimated by linear methods.
The service environment frequently includes hostile corrodents to varying degrees.
Two effects are noted: First, the rate of fatigue crack propagation is usually increased,
especially if extended time is available for corrosive action to operate. Second, the
crack may grow due to corrosion under prolonged steady stress. The steady stress may
arise from residual stresses introduced during manufacture, from the dead weight of the
structure when not in use or from the "1-g" flight condition. Research on this phenomenon
has identified a threshold stress intensity level Kth which must be exceeded to produce
crack growth, but rates of growth cannot yet be estimated. Some materials suffer enough
crack growth to cause failure in minutes under moderate stresses and a water environ-
ment.
Similarly, a service environment that involves significant temperature variations
may produce still another influence on rates of crack growth. Complex interactions
arise between changes of properties due to heating, intensification of corrosive influences
and local creep effects which tend to make the phenomenon sensitive to time. at load or
temperature. Effects due to temperature variations can accelerate crack growth by
factors of 100.
A further parameter in the estimation of rates of crack growth is the influence of
structural configuration. Mathematical analyses have been developed for the stress
intensity at cracks emanating from simple stress concentrations like holes, and some
experimental verifications have been performed. However, a host of possible geometri-
cal configurations, combinations of stress states and shapes of cracks pose a formidable
challenge to researchers in this area. Similarly, the effects of stringers have been
analyzed and experimentally verified. Rates of crack propagation can be reduced by
factors greater than 10 by judicious deployment of stiffeners. Thus, research in this
area should lead to significant improvements in life and residual strength.
Conclusions:
The foregoing discussion reveals that the use of crack propagation as a design
tool is still in its infancy. Research in the area has accelerated rapidly during the past
decade. This work has led to an appreciation of the parameters involved and some
approximate rules of thumb. However, a large number of parameters influence the
phenomenon and most of them have not been investigated to the extent necessary to
provide quantitative design rules. Catalogs of properties and analytical procedures are
needed.
B-35
Recommendations:
1. NASA should sponsor a program of gathering the existing data on subcritical flaw
growth, fitting rational analytical expressions to the data and compiling the results
in a format useful to the designer. Data-generating studies should be sponsored
to develop consistent test methods and to fill existing data gaps.
2. A systematic investigation of the influence of other important parameters should
be planned and executed. Special emphasis should be placed on interaction effects
for complex time histories of stress, on the effects of practical structural con-
figurations, and on time-dependent effects at elevated temperatures.
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NONDESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION
by R. Wasel (RPX) and
H. M. Weiss (KR)
NASA Headquarters
Background
Adequate nondestructive evaluation, like the escape system on Apollo, is not a
substitute for high quality manufacture, but rather a final safety factor. Regardless of
the limitations of the various NDE systems, they are still the final recourse in the
prevention of structural failure. These limitations must be understood by the designer,
manufacturer, and inspector if maximum use is to be made of advanced structural
materials. Aside from the technical limitations of the systems, there is an equally
important management problem-assuring that the latest NDE technology information
is made available to the tester, is included in appropriate specifications, and is used
conscienitiously in inspection.
As the use of high strength materials is increased, while attempting to maintain
low safety factors, dependence on NDE capability increases. In general, as the strength
level of a material increases, it becomes susceptible to ever smaller flaws, and the
ability to detect these defects must increase proportionally. The alternatives to
improving the technology are to avoid use of the stronger materials, use them at a
degraded stress level, or limit their use to applications where comprehensive load
testing is feasible.
NASA efforts in development of improved NDE techniques are largely concentrated
at Marshall Space Flight Center. Lewis Research Center has a small program and is
initiating more work. Current work at Marshall Space Flight Center has been largely
stimulated by fabrication problems, mostly welding and bonding. The S-IV B-503 test
stand explosion (Jan. 1967) instigated development of an eddy current test to check weld
wire on titanium pressure vessels. Other NDE improvements, cited in response to the
S-IV B-503 Review Board's recommendations concerning inspection technique improve-
ment (ref. 1), included development of the more sensitive Ultrasonic Delta technique.
This technique has been applied to factory testing of current production steel forgings
for the wing pivots and carry-through structure on the F-111 airplane (ref. 2). Other
areas of current interest include radiographic image enhancement and readout methods
and techniques for measuring stress, stress corrosion, and an assessment of filamen-
tary composites. Investigations are underway to allow detection of metallurgical
defects such as grain boundaries, improper alloys, etc.
Capability of Crack Detection
The need for a comprehensive evaluation of NDE procedures was a conclusion
in the assessment of the hydrotest failure of the 260-inch SL-1 motor case (ref. 3).
Unfortunately the majority of NDE equipment was developed using instrument calibration
standards which were far from representative of cracks in actual hardware. Thus, in
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most cases the resolving power of a given method in terms of crack size is frequently
much poorer than would be indicated by its specifications. It is only very recently
that attempts have been made to use actual cracks in the development and the calibration
of NDE techniques. These studies have revealed that the full potential of NDE to assess
a structure requires the application of several complementary techniques (e.g.,
radiography, ultrasonics, and liquid penetrants) to that particular structure. The
state of the art of NDE for structural composites is considerably less mature than that
for homogeneous metallic structures. The procedures for evaluating composites are
largely adaptations of those for metals, and it is only recently that new approaches
have been considered. Among those being evaluated by DOD and NASA are systems
employing microwaves, thermal characteristics, holography, and neutron radiography.
More efforts are needed in this area, particularly if the NASA shuttle is to employ
lightweight nonmetallic structures.
It is important to recognize that dangerous flaws can sometimes be present in the
form of structures which are essentially coherent with the matrix (e.g., grain boundary
films, hydrogen embrittled regions, etc.) and, therefore, impossible to detect by any
presently available NDE technique. These types of structures are more likely to be
encountered in complex high strength alloys than in the more commonly used materials.
Their development is influenced by fabrication processes and heat treatment, and they
can be revealed by metallurgical examination and destructive testing. It is important
that the tendency of a new material to form such structures be investigated before it is
placed in service.
No NDE procedure can be effective if the structure is so designed that
"inspectability" is compromised by inaccessibility of the critical areas to the inspection
equipment. Thus the inspectability of the final hardware must be a criterion in the
selection of materials and in the assignment of safe operating stresses. In the area of
materials, it is possible that a reliable, flaw-tolerant, conventional material may be
superior in weight and cost to an advanced ultra-high-strength material which may
require large safety factors because of NDE uncertainty. All major programs should
have an overall NDE plan, assembling inspection criteria and procedures in a document
addressed to the operator. Geometrically similar models of the hardware to be tested
should be made available for flaw detection equipment checkout. Quality engineers
trained in NDE should review fabrication documents to ensure that critical flaws can be
detected by the methods proposed.
Description and Specification of Techniques
The current state of technology in NDE is difficult to establish precisely. It is
known by experts and partially understood by users, but it has not been properly
documented. Thus, there is no source that describes the qualitative and quantitative
capabilities of the various NDE methods as they are known. NASA has published a
series of reports (refs. 4 to 16) describing the range of NDE methods and applications
as well as a sequence of training manuals (refs. 17 to 21). Published literature and
commonly used specifications and standards emphasize the qualitative measures of
NDE methods rather than their resolving power in regard to actual cracks. Present
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fabrication and hardware specifications usually describe acceptance/rejection criteria
based on the theoretical capabilities of inspection methods rather than on the actual
performance as derived from test data and/or fracture mechanics analysis. Much
NASA-sponsored test data and fracture mechanics analyses are developed for a
particular structure and are recorded in contractor-generated technical documents
(e.g., test reports or inspection standards). NASA has no specification policy or
method of applying such data in a form useful to anyone other than the original contractor.
It should be required that quantitative acceptance/rejection criteria be used rather than
simply referring to the theoretical capabilities of the systems. It should also be
required that the NDE systems used should be validated for the job.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Deficiencies in the technology: The following deficiencies in the present NDE technology
can be recognized:
1. It is apparent that the theoretical potential of presently available NDE techniques
is frequently not realized when applied to the problem of finding crack-like
flaws in actual hardware.
2. No generally recognized standards exist which permit judgement of the actual
precision of a particular NDE technique, nor is there any general agreement as
to how NDE operators should be qualified.
3. Frequently the potential value of NDE techniques is compromised by a lack of
inspectability of the finished hardware.
4. The development of NDE techniques for composite structures is in an embryonic
state, and at present our capability is only marginally adequate to satisfy NASA's
needs.
Recommended actions: The following actions are recommended to improve the capability
of NDE methods and to increase the reliability with which they can be applied to
practical hardware items. The alternatives to actions such as these are to avoid
using new high strength materials, use them at degraded stress levels, or limit their
use to only those structures where comprehensive load testing is feasible.
1. Standards should be developed for the assessment of the sensitivity of various
NDE techniques to actual cracks and crack-like flaws.
2. All major hardware programs should have an overall NDE plan that would
assemble all pertinent inspection criteria procedures into a document addressed
to properly qualified operators. These plans should be developed in the initial
phases of design and should take into account the limitations of the available
NDF equipment and inspectability of the finished hardware. Inspection steps
B-39
should be carefully defined in terms of the fabrication stages, and special
consideration should be given to field inspection problems.
3. To record the present state of the art in NDE, it is recommended that a design
criteria mongraph be issued by NASA that would cover the known qualitative
and quantitative limitations of presently available NDE methods. This document
should be updated regularly.
4. Special emphasis should be given to the development of NDE methods for composite
structures.
5. An organizational focal point should be established within NASA to act as a
central coordinating point for NDE activities, be an authoritative reference source,
minimize duplication in research and development activities, and help identify
those areas needing additional research.
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COMPOSITE MATERIALS
by R. H. Kemp
NASA Lewis Research Center
Status of Technology
Various forms of composites have been in extensive use for many years. However,
with the advent of the more recent high strength and high elastic-modulus fibers, it has
become possible to develop advanced fiber-matrix systems and fiber composite reinforced
metals with unusually high strength and modulus properties. Of even greater importance
to the aerospace industry is the fact that high strength and modulus can be obtained at the
same time the component or structure weight is reduced because of the high strength-to-
weight ratios and high modulus-to-weight ratios of these new materials. The manner
in which information is gathered concerning these materials, the manner in which they
are tested, designed, and fabricated is quite different from that for conventional metals.
Therefore, new methods and procedures are required to assure the integrity and
reliability of composite components and structures. For example, one important difference
concerns the way in which a component or structure is constructed. In metal fabrication,
the alloy is formed first and then cast, worked, or machined into the final form. In
composites fabrication, the constituent fibers and matrix are "built up" by one of several
methods directly into the final shape or configuration. In other words, "properties" or
"characteristics" are built into the component, not only as a function of the properties
of the constituents, but also as a function of the way the constituents are placed in the
final product. The technology base that must be established to permit the reliable use of
components produced in this fashion will necessarily be quite different from the type of
technology base used for metals.
The design of advanced composite components or structures is based on methods
or procedures that have been evolved relatively recently and are not as sophisticated as
would be desired. As a result, composite components are often fabricated in a semi-
empirical fashion and then tested as components to determine how to improve their
design. The design methods such as the laminate analyses must be improved and expanded
to permit design optimization without expensive experimental iteration.
In connection with the topic of developing a technology base, there is a general
problem of identification and characterization of composites that must be dealt with.
Very frequeniLiy, property data are quoted in the literature (even in the handbooks)
without identifying the composite beyond giving the fiber and resin names and perhaps
the fiber orientation. Such data can be used only as a rough indication of the performance
of a general system and cannot be used for design or research purposes. Mechanical
and thermal properties can vary widely depending on additional factors such as:
(1) Amount and direction of fiber in each layer
(2) Fiber or matrix volume content
(3) Void content and distribution
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(4) Fiber surface treatment
(5) Fabrication procedure
(6) Cure procedure (pressure, temperature, and time)
(7) Postcure treatment
(8) Method of testing
(9) Test environment
The various laboratories and agencies should be encouraged to provide complete
identification of a composite when property information is published. Such data can then
be used for design purposes (at least material selection), correlation purposes, and
research background information.
Selection of Materials
Many standards or handbooks have been published for composites (refs. 1 to 5).
An examination of these standards or handbooks indicates considerable disparity among
the recommended test specimens and procedures. There are, for example, at least
five published methods for making an interlaminar shear test. In one of these tests
(the short beam shear test), there is a wide variance in the ratio of span to depth used
by different laboratories. In other words, in addition to the variations published in the
standards, there are further variations imposed by the people using the tests. Con-
siderable work needs to be done to unify the standards and procedures to eliminate
the ambiguity that presently exists. This can be done by an analytical and experimental
procedure in each case to determine the most appropriate method for the information
desired.
In lieu of established, definitive, and well-accepted procedures, the industry is
probably best advised to choose test specimens and methods that most closely represent
the conditions encountered in a given design or component. This procedure, however,
leads to much redundancy in testing and accumulation of data that are difficult to compare
with data from other tests.
Data for Hardware Design
In general, data quoted in the literature are average data and are unsuitable for
design purposes. Because of the unhomogeneous nature of composites, the manner in
which they are fabricated, and the intrinsic variability of the properties of the consti-
tuents, there tends to be more scatter in the data from a given set of tests than might be
desired. Statistical data are needed to provide the information required for reliability
study purposes and to establish lower bounds. As stated previously, such data must
be accompanied by a complete identification of the composite to make the information
of value to the designer. In certain cases, statistical data have been generated for
specific fiber-matrix systems, but these data are usually retained as company propri-
etary information.
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In particular, data are lacking for temperatures other than room temperature,
for directions other than parallel to the fiber, and for most thermal characteristics.
The use of data banks with quick information retrieval would be most helpful for
design purposes and should be established along the lines of existing metal alloy systems.
The generation of additional property data for data bank storage is highly desirable.
One drawback in this proposal is the fact that the rapid progress in developing new
fiber-matrix systems causes existing data to become out-dated rather quickly.
Materials Specifications
In general, materials specifications have not been well established or negotiated
between the consumer and the supplier. Stated constituent properties are usually quite
"loose" with a high degree of variability involved. It generally remains for the consumer
to fabricate specimens or components and to establish his own specifications in building
a specific piece of hardware.
Design Methods
Composite laminate analyses, and winding and overwrapping analyses exist, but
require experimental verification in most cases and also extensions to include all the
factors that should be considered in design. In particular, analyses must be developed
that will permit the optimization of composite layups to provide the lightest and strongest
configuration, and design criteria must be evolved and established for all composite and
composite reinforced metal structures.
Special Problems
1. Translation of uniaxial specimen data to structural or component strength values-
The use of data obtained from uniaxial, simple specimens for the design of complex
composite components or structures can be very dangerous. Careful allowance
must be made for possible reductions in property values in going from the specimen
data to component or structure values due to a host of factors including differences in:
a. Fiber orientation and distribution
be Fiber content
c. Void content
d. Fabrication
e. Cure procedure
f. Environment
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It is, therefore, very important in the design of composite structures to use data
that are appropriate and commensurate with the configuration and conditions
existing in the structure.
2. Effect of residual stresses and thermal cycling on structural integrity-Because of
the differences in coefficient of expansion of the fibers and matrices, considerable
residual stresses transverse to the fiber direction can occur when the composite is
returned to room temperature from the maximum temperature of the cure cycle.
This phenomenon occurs in multi-ply composites and, in general, produces higher
residual stresses as the angle between the fibers in adjacent plies becomes greater.
Cracking of the matrix can occur in cooling to room temperature. Possible
degradation of strength properties of the composite should be considered in any
design involving this phenomenon.
Degradation of strength properties can also occur as a result of cycling between
two temperature levels. This is similar to the low cycle thermal fatigue process
in metals. In addition, deterioration can occur with time (particularly in the resin
of resin-fiber composites) as a function of the exposure temperature.
3. Failure mechanisms of composites-Considerable information is needed concerning
the various failure mechanisms that can occur in composites. In particular,
information is required concerning the effect of cracks, flaws, and other stress
raisers on structural integrity. Flaw or crack propagation rates are needed as a
function of stress levels, number of cycles of loading, and the environment.
4. Effect of lightning strikes on composites-Some high strength fibers are very strong
dielectrics and subject to damage by the passage of high electrical currents of mag-
nitude encountered in lightning strikes. Consequently considerable information is
needed on the damage effects in various fibers of fiber-resin matrix composites when
struck by lightning, and on the protection of these types of structures when used in
aircraft or space vehicles.
5. Nondestructive inspection-Many nondestructive testing methods have been examined in
great detail to determine their applicability to finding defects, flaws, and cracks in
composites that occur in manufacture or in service. Some of the methods, such as
ultrasonic mapping, have shown some promise for isolating and defining certain
types of defects. However, other types of defects are very difficult to detect,
particularly in large parts where the amount of time required becomes excessive.
The situation is complicated further by the fact that there is very little informa-
tion concerning the propagation rates of flaws and defects under cyclic loading. It
is therefore not clear in most composite systems what sizes or numbers of flaws can
be tolerated. Preparation of specifications that define limits for flaws and defects at
this time is largely guesswork.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The development and application of fiber composites, although progressing rapidly,
must be considered to be a new technology in its very early stage of development.
Their application as large areas of load-carrying members of large vehicles must await
the evolution of this new technology and suitably trained people. With concentrated effort,
fiber composites can be applied to critical hardware where the potential weight savings
justifies the effort.
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As indicated in the more detailed discussion of this topic, however, almost
every input required for rational design of highly stressed hardware from composites
requires additional information. Typical needs are:
(1) Standardized test methods to determine mechanical properties
(2) Properties for material selection and design
(3) Specifications for the components (matrix and fiber) of the composites
(4) Improved design methods incorporating the effects of manufacturing residual
stresses and thermal stresses, particularly for structures requiring other
than uniaxial fibers (design method manuals)
(5) Nondestructive evaluation methods to ensure the quality of the finished product
and its integrity in service
Additional problem areas are:
(1) Impact, toughness, and fracture
(2) Lightning protection
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APPENDIX C: DOCUMENTATION AND COMMUNICATION OF INFORMATION
by George C. Deutsch (RW)
and T. V. Cooney (RAL)
NASA Headquarters
This appendix presents the report of the Panel on Documentation and Communication
of Information. The information to be communicated includes failure analyses, mechanical
and physical properties of structural materials, the influence of fabrication processes
and service conditions on these properties, and methods of structural analysis that in-
corporate these properties in design procedures. The Panel addressed the question of
whether these types of information are adequately documented and communicated through-
out NASA's program management system. Consideration is given to the following:
(1) sources of information, (2) accessibility of information, and (3) discipline in the use
of information. The conclusions and recommendations of the Panel are summarized in
the final section of this appendix.
Sources of Information
Many sources of information are available. Among them are:
(1) Nationally recognized handbooks
(a) MIL-Hdbk-5 provides design mechanical properties for metallic alloys
and for some structural elements such as spot welds. These properties
are in most cases established on a recognized statistical basis and
are accepted for the purposes of design by DOD and FAA. In general,
only the most commonly used alloys are included in this handbook
because a large amount of data is necessary to establish design values
with a high degree of confidence. Alloy design values are given only
for the strength as determined in tension, compression, shear, and
bearing. Typical or average values are sometimes given for elastic
moduli, fatigue strength, plane strain fracture toughness, and certain
physical properties. This handbook is very limited in its coverage of
strength limiting factors such as stress corrosion, hydrogen embrittle-
ment, high stress concentrations, etc.
(b) MIL-Hdbk-17 is similar in most respects to MIL-Hdbk-5 except that it
is concerned primarily with the mechanical properties of glass-rein-
forced plastics and to a lesser extent with boron-reinforced plastic; it
does not present design formulas.
(c) MIL-Hdbk-23 is a design guide for aircraft sandwich construction. It
does not give mechanical properties but rather design formulas which
can be used with the mechanical properties in MIL-Hdbk-5 and 17.
(d) The Aerospace Structural Metals Handbook is particularly useful in
alloy selection. Typical mechanical properties and physical properties
are given for approximately 200 alloys of interest to the aerospace
industry. Quarterly supplements provide both revised and new chapters.
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Special attention is paid to those factors associated with the history
and service conditions which might limit the load-carrying capacity
of an alloy. Thus, emphasis is placed on fracture properties, stress
corrosion, hydrogen embrittlement, effects of impurities, etc. This
handbook is prepared under an Air Force contract and has been under
pressure from DOD to become self-supporting. As might be expected,
it has been very difficult to approach this goal because of the limited
nature of the market.
(e) The Metals Handbook is a publication of the American Society of
Metals. It has very broad coverage of many alloys and fabrication
processes of general commercial interest, but lacks a detailed treat-
ment of aerospace alloys.
(2) Information Centers (DOD materials oriented):
(a) Air Force Machinability Center
Metcut Research Associates, Inc.
Cincinnati, Ohio 45209
(b) Concrete Technology Information Analysis Center
Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station
Vicksburg, Miss. 39180
(c) DASA Information and Analysis Center (Nuclear Explosion Effects)
General Electric-TEMPO
Santa Barbara, Calif. 93102
(d) Defense Ceramic Information Center
Battelle Memorial Institute
Columbus, Ohio 43201
(e) Defense Metals Information Center
Battelle Memorial Institute
Columbus, Ohio 43201
(f) Mechanical Properties Data Center
Belfour Stulen, Inc.
Traverse City, Mich. 49684
(g) Nondestructive Testing Information Analysis Center
Army Materials & Mechanics Research Center (Code AMXMR-TX)
Watertown, Mass. 02172
(h) Plastics Technical Evaluation Center
Picatinny Arsenal, Bldg. 3401
Dover, New Jersey 07801
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(i) Shock and Vibration Information Center
Naval Research Laboratory (Code 6020)
Washington, D. C. 20390
(j) Thermophysical Properties Research Center
Purdue University, Research Park
West Lafayette, Ind. 47906
These Centers in some cases use computer facilities for the storage and
classification of data taken from published sources. Some publish periodic
reviews; noteworthy among these is the Defense Metals Information Center
which publishes monthly reviews in many different areas of metals technology.
All the Information Centers are designed for rapid response to requests for
information. These Centers receive their support from the DOD Office of
Deputy Director of Defense for Research and Engineering and have been under
continuous pressure to become self-supporting through sale Of their services.
Attempts to approach this method of operation have not met with notable
success because of the inherently limited nature of the market. At present
these attempts are futile because of the depressed conditions of the aerospace
industry.
(3) Special handbooks-Some government organizations or their large program
offices publish special handbooks that are directed to a specific application.
They contain data taken from the technical literature as well as data
generated for their own use. An advantage of these documents is that all
engineers associated with a particular program use the same data. They
have the disadvantage of specialization and frequently of relatively short life.
There are many such documents. Typical examples are:
(a) Aircraft Designers Handbook for Titanium and Titanium Alloys published
by the FAA Supersonic Transport Office
(b) NERVA Program, Ferrous Metals, and Metallic Materials Handbook
(c) JPL - Spacecraft Materials Guidebook
(d) MSC-02681 Nonmetallic Materials Design Guidelines and Test Data
Handbook
(e) Advanced Composite Handbook published by the Air Force
(f) Cryogenic Materials Handbook published by the National Bureau of
Standards
(4) Open technical literature-The open literature in the materials field is
voluminous and not well organized for use by designers. It is largely a means
for communication between those engaged in research.
(5) Company brochures-The large materials producers publish elaborate compila-
tions of data and advertising material relating to their own alloys. These are
generally useful documents although in many cases the data are poorly
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defined as to form and heat treatment, and frequently only the "best" infor-
mation is presented. These sources of information seldom give a thorough
presentation of the problems encountered with application of a particular
alloy.
(6) Company files-Most aerospace companies maintain files of data pertinent
to their programs, and much of this never gets into the widely available
sources such as the Data Centers and handbooks. These files are generally
proprietary, but in many cases specific requests for information will be
honored. The basic problem with this source of data is that there is no way
of knowing where the desired information may be located.
Accessiblity of Information
Data Centers and handbooks offer an expeditious way to make the vast amount of
pertinent data available to designers. However, the Air Force Data Centers and the
Aerospace Structural Metals Handbook have always had a tenuous existence and a
variable funding history which has not helped their efficiency. As mentioned previously,
DOD expects these activities to become self-supporting, and has gradually reduced their
support until at present it is about two-thirds of that in 1969. The current plans of the
Office of Defense Research and Engineering are to require that the Information Centers
obtain at least 50 percent of their support in fiscal year 1972 from selling their services
or lose all DOD support in the future. As mentioned previously, the market for their
services is inherently limited and now it is even more so. This DOD goal of 50 percent
self-support during 1972 seems unrealistic, and insistence on it may spell the end of
many of the Information Centers.
It seems evident that what is needed is a strengthening of these services rather
than their termination. However, this should not be done by increasing their number.
Further proliferation of sources would diminish rather than increase the accessibility
of information. Consequently, the Panel recommends that NASA seek ways to cooperate
with the Air Force and ODDRE to maintain support for selected activities including
the three MIL-Handbooks, the Aerospace Structural Metals Handbook, and the Defense
Metals Information Center. Improvements are desirable in two areas: (1) an increased
capability to obtain data from unpublished sources such as company files, and (2) an
increased coverage in terms of new alloys and more frequent updating of information on
established materials. In respect to this last point, it is very important that, once a
widely used handbook has been established, support should be continued.
The Aerospace Structrual Metals Handbook suffers from a data accessibility
problem that is probably common to other NASA and Air Force supported handbooks
and data centers. This handbook is dependent for much of its information on reports
issued by NASA and the Air Force either through their in-house or contract activities.
At present there is no system which ensures that the Mechanical Properties Data Center,
which compiles the handbook, will automatically receive pertinent reports from these
activities. It would be highly advantageous if the originating Division within the Air
Force and NASA would identify their research projects which generate mechanical and
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physical property data pertinent to the handbook and make arrangements to place the
Mechanical Properties Data Center on an automatic distribution list for reports issuing
from these projects.
A problem closely related to the accessibility of information is encountered by
those who attempt to use the NASA or DOD computerized facilities to search for metals
property data. To be effective, such searches require access to the titles of reports
that contain information on particular alloy types. Unfortunately there is no coding system
in use which would permit a search using commonly accepted alloy designations. In
other words, there is no way for an engineer to request titles of reports which would
contain physical or mechanical property data on common alloy types such as 4340 or
maraging steel. The introduction of the necessary coding systems should be a relatively
easy job, and if possible they should be compatible with the coding system used in the
Aerospace Structural Metals Handbook. In this way information could be more readily
located by those who prepare handbook chapters.
Discipline In The Use of Information
Information that is not readily available for use by the designer at the appropriate
time is of little practical value regardless of the care with which it has been catalogued.
Furthermore, the designer cannot be expected to be an expert in materials behavior or
in special aspects of structural analysis such as crack mechanics. Nevertheless,
management cannot make a sound judgement concerning the risks of structural failure
without recommendations from specialists in these fields. Their input should be injected
into the program in the planning stages because it generally will have a strong bearing on
the expected vehicle weight and performance. If this is deferred until well along in the
project development, recommendations designed to reduce failure risks are more likely
to be compromised to preserve the established weight and performance requirements.
It is obviously impossible to ensure by contractual obligation that all the special
information necessary to make a sound judgement concerning failure risks as balanced
against performance requirements will be available at the right time and in the right place.
However, a number of steps can be taken to encourage the timely use of existing infor-
mation by the program offices within NASA and by NASA's contractors. The following
outlines several such steps:
(1) Introduction of materials and structural analysis specialists into the project
at the planning stage well before weight and performance requirements have
become fixed. In some cases this might be done by forming Review Panels
composed of specialists from NASA Centers and from appropriate outside
organizations.
(2) Development of a "Materials Selection Guide" identifying material conditions
that are particularly sensitive to strength limiting factors such as stress
corrosion, small flaws, fabrication processes, etc. This document should
be included in contracts, and the contractor should be required to justify
the use of a sensitive material condition by showing how the sensitivity will
be overcome or will not increase the risk of failure.
(3) Circulation of materials selection guides, lists of persons within NASA and
other Government agencies that are specialists in selected technical areas,
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and reports that specify sources of information on materials properties and
new designs concepts.
(4) Development of standard reporting methods for failure analysis and arrange-
ment for distribution of this information to all pertinent parties. At present
there is no standardized method of reporting failures nor is there an
effective method for distribution of failure analyses. The result is that
trends with regard to specific materials or structural types are very difficult
to determine. Our present ALERT system has been successful in reporting
failures in hydraulic, electric, and electronic components but has not been
effectively used for structural materials. The IDEP (Interagency Data
Exchange Program) has not been effective for structural materials failures
either. Perhaps one of these systems could be extended to provide the
necessary structures coverage. Consideration should also be given to the
preparation of digests of failure experience. Such digests would provide
wide dissemination of information and provide an easy opportunity to discern
trends.
Conclusions and Recommendations
It is the conclusion of the Panel on Documentation and Communication of Information
that the risk of failure of aerospace structures could be significantly reduced and the
costs of their development decreased if the documentation and means of communication
for materials information could be improved. At the present time NASA is weak in this
area and has no clearly defined group whose responsibility it is to assist the program
offices in locating information on failure experience, materials property data, and
special structural analysis concepts. As stated previously, most of NASA's past failures
were associated with conventional, well established alloys for which much pertinent data
had been accumulated. It appears that in most cases where difficulties arose an
important factor was the lack of information by the proper person at the proper time.
The need for effective dissemination of technical information will become even more
critical as NASA is forced to use new types of materials such as dispersion strengthened
alloys, ceramics, and composites, Data on these new materials are relatively scarce,
and almost none are in the standard handbooks. The need to transmit these data speedily
from the point of origin to the user provides a further incentive to strengthen the
appropriate data sources and provide ready access to them.
The Panel recommends that NASA take the following actions, designed to strengthen
its position in the field of documentation and dissemination of technical information, to
ensure more effective use of such information by the NASA program offices and their
contractors:
1. NASA should increase its support (with other Government agencies) of selected
activities that accumulate and analyze physical and mechanical property data on
metals, composites, and plastics of particular interest to the aerospace industry.
Examples of such activities that should be supported include the following Air
Force sponsored documents:
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a. The Aerospace Structural Metals Handbook
b. MIL-Handbooks 5, 17, and 23
c. The Defense Metals Information Center
2. NASA should contractually require that:
a. A failure mode analysis be conducted for all major structural compo-
nents and that the contractor demonstrate the existence of a fracture
control program and the means for its implementation
b. The data and the sources of data used for design be reported
c. Material specialists be used in the drawing approval chain for all
potentially critical structural components
3. NASA should take the steps outlined in the previous section of this appendix to
encourage the timely use of technical information by NASA program offices and
their contractors.
4. NASA should continue and expand its structural design criteria program to ensure
that criteria are prepared on a time schedule consistent with project needs. NASA
should encourage the use of these criteria by project offices.
5. NASA should cooperate with the appropriate technical society and government
agencies to establish standardized materials specifications that meet its needs.
6. NASA should consider preparing a series of courses (possibly on film) of selected
subjects that are closely related to critical problem areas. These should be
distributed to both NASA Centers and contractors. It would be desirable to require
contractually the key people in design groups to take such courses.
7. It is recommended that an office be designated in OART (possibly in the Materials
and Structures Division) to define more fully and implement these specific
recommendations. This office would, of course, draw on the expertise at NASA
Centers and program offices in carrying out its work.
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APPENDIX D: Authorization for the Committee and
Committee Membership
APPENDIX D: AUTHORIZATION FOR THE COMMITTEE AND MEMBERSHIP
The Committee was established on June 22, 1970 by the Acting Administrator for
Advanced Research and Technology (attachment A) in response to a request from the
Deputy Administrator in a memorandum dated April 28, 1970 (attachment B).
The membership of the Committee is as follows:
Chairman, William R. Lucas, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center
Vice-Chairman, G. Mervin Ault, NASA Lewis Research Center
Secretary, Richard H. Raring, NASA Headquarters
William F. Brown, Jr., NASA Lewis Research Center
Patrick T. Chiarito, NASA Lewis Research Center
Thomas V. Cooney, NASA Headquarters
George C. Deutsch, NASA Headquarters
Herbert F. Hardrath, NASA Langley Research Center
Richard R. Heldenfels, NASA Langley Research Center
Robert E. Johnson, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center
Merland L. Moseson, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center
Robert A. Wasel, NASA Headquarters
Howard M. Weiss, NASA Headquarters
R. F. Hoener, WPAFB, Flight Dynamic Lab.
J. J. Mattice, WPAFB, Materials Lab.
The composition of the Committee reflects special knowledge in the following areas:
(1) Structural materials used in NASA aerospace vehicles and ground support
equipment
(2) Mechanical properties of materials including fracture resistance
(3) Failure investigations and analysis
(4) Activities of the NASA Offices of R&QA and Design Criteria
(5) Nearly all of NASA's space flight programs
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ATTACHMENT A
A' a m'\ . NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
U' ( WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546
REPLY TO
ATTN OF: RV
June 22, 1970
TO: Distribution List
FROM: R/Acting Associate Administrator for Advanced
Research and Technology
SUBJECT: NASA Ad Hoc Committee on Failure of High-Strength
Structural Materials
I am convening, and appointing the addressees to, the subject
committee to examine NASA's past and possible future troubles
with high-strength structural materials. The committee's charge
and composition will be as stated in the enclosed notes of the
June 8, 1970 meeting at NASA Headquarters. The circumstances
that led to that meeting, and other pertinent background material,
appear in the attachments to the notes to that meeting.
The first meeting of the committee will be held at NASA Headquar-
ters at 9:30 a.m. on Wednesday, July 1, 1970, in Room 521J, FOB-
10B. The agenda for this meeting is attached.
The appointments of the representatives from the NASA Centers
have been requested through their Center Directors. I am advising
them of this action by a copy of this letter.
Oran W. Nicks
Attachments
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Distribution:
RA/William S. Aiken, Jr.
RPM/Robert A. Wasel
RR-1/George C. Deutsch
RRM/Richard H. Raring
RVA/Thomas V. Cooney
RY/H. Kurt Strass
KR/Howard M. Weiss
Information:
GSFC/Merland L. Moseson
GSFC/Robert R. Ziemer
LaRC/Herbert F. Hardrath
LaRC/Richard R. Heldenfels
LeRC/G. Mervin Ault
LeRC/William F. Brown, Jr.
LeRC/Irving I. Pinkel
MSC/Robert E. Johnson
MSFC/William R. Lucas
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AGENDA
NASA AD-HOC COMMITTEE ON FAILURE OF
HIGH STRENGTH STRUCTURAL MATERIALS
Washington, D. C., FOB 10B, Room 521-J
July 1, 1970 - 9:30 AM
I How Committee Came Into Being
II Objectives of Committee
A. Documentation of Failures
B. Define Needed New Research
C. Examine Needs for Publication and Distribution
of Engineering Data
III Rationale of Composition - Members Selected Chiefly
for Items:
A. Documentation Role -
Lucas, Hardrath, Johnson, Moseson, Weiss, Ziemer
B. New Research Needs -
Ault, Aiken, Brown, Deutsch, Heldenfels, Pinkel,
Wasel
C. Data Publication -
Ault, Brown, Cooney, Deutsch
IV Modus Operandi
V Expected Life of Committee and Number of Meetings Needed
VI Assignments
VII Next Meeting
VIII Adjourn
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ATTACHMENT B
"; '"~ 7 NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546
REPLY TOATTN OF: Office of the Administrator April 28, 1970
MEMORANDUM
TO: R/Acting Associate Administrator for Advanced Research
and Technology
FROM: AD/Deputy Administrator
SUBJECT: Materials Problems
When you first moved to OART, I discussed with you my concern about
materials in the context of problems that were now appearing on the
F-111, C-5A, etc.
As I recall, I related to you some of the materials problems that we
had encountered in Apollo and asked what was being done by NASA to
collect and publish all that is now known about the application of new
high-strength materials. There probably wasn't a single instance
where we used a new material in a high-strength application in Apollo
where we didn't subsequently run into some sort of a major problem.
Somehow we learned to live with these problems or to do something
about them, but we never really took time to publish what we had
learned.
Bob Seamans' letter of April 17, 1970, (with action assigned to OART)
again reminded me of the subject. I think we should certainly support
the Air Force and work with them in this matter, as Bob Seamans
suggests. But even more important, I think that NASA should start
a strong in-house effort in this area. If you have not had a chance to
do anything about this since our original discussion, I would suggest
that you convene an ad hoc task group, including Bill Lucas from
Marshall, Joe Kotanchik from MSC, Ault Brown from Lewis, and
others from other Centers. The task group's charter should be to
collect information that has become available during the past two or
three years and see to it that it is published as quickly as possible.
Further, the task group should look at the area as a whole, with a view
toward determining what additional research NASA should perform.
(In light of the Apollo 13 accident, I would imagine that Lucas and
Kotanchik will not be available during the next several weeks.)
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I would also like to discuss with you the membership that we would
propose for the steering or executive committee mentioned in Bob
Seamans' letter before we make any final decisions in this matter.
Please call me when you have had a chance to think this over.
George M. Low
NASA-Langley, 1972D-6
